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Cutting speed limits to help reduce greenhouse emissions and pollution, noise, road accidents and encourage walking and cycling

Unlike many of the measures proposed by many nations and the business lobby today which see technology as the answer to reducing greenhouse emission reductions, the focus of this initiative is not on technology but behavioural change designed to get people out of their cars and onto their bikes or simply walk more and limit car use for essential travel. It is a measure that can be implemented with immediate effect at minimal cost. A growing number of cities are doing this in Europe and it has popular support. It is a no brainer and we should be doing it here.

Quoting extensively from the report by Angela Charlton and Jeffrey Schaeffer in The Age 7th October 2021, the latest city to do this is Paris which already had a 30kph limit on about 60% of the city but will extend this to all of the city with the exception of a few main thoroughfares where a 50kph limit will apply.

Other French cities with a 30 kph limit include Bordeaux, Strasbourg and Toulouse, but it is becoming more common elsewhere in Europe. Brussels imposed a 30kph limit on much of the city earlier this year and about 80% of Berlin’s streets have the same rule. Madrid has had speed curbs on most of the city centre since 2018 with a nationwide rule in Spain this year putting a 30kph limit on all one-way urban roads. Similar restrictions apply in residential Amsterdam and the city is proposing to expand this to larger roads.

It is almost certain this trend will continue at an escalating rate – not just in Europe but elsewhere reinforcing the environmental imperative which was clearly stated at our last forum ie to travel less, less often and more efficiently and to focus on behavioural change as the principal lever for reducing greenhouse emissions.  This imperative applies to Australian cities and towns so it is time our politicians showed political courage and implement similar measures. This will require sophisticated strategies for managing the transition but it is critical these be developed as part of a comprehensive plan to reduce greenhouse emissions and implement it as a matter of urgency. It will require a fundamental change in government mindset however and the abandonment of many of the big build infrastructure projects being pursued by this government and other policies which continue to promote car use and car dependence instead of reducing it.

Some may argue that Australian cities are different – less densely populated and more spread out requiring longer distances to work and essential services, and pin their hopes on electric vehicles. Unfortunately the reliance on technology and EV’s in particular as discussed in an earlier blog is a false hope. It is necessary to include the energy impacts for the entire life of the vehicle – extraction and processing of raw materials, its manufacture etc as well as its use, maintenance and disposal at the end of its life. On this basis the footprint for an EV is no better than a conventional petrol driven car, and this assumes the electric power required for charging the vehicle comes from renewable sources – which in the case of Victoria is not the case and will take many years to achieve.  

Whilst there will be opportunities to improve the environmental footprint of these vehicles, this will take time and even if this was achieved the ability to replace the existing fleet and the capacity of the community to afford it by 2030 is highly improbable. This means we have no choice but to change our behaviour. The 1973 OPEC oil crisis demonstrated that dramatic changes can be achieved when communities and nations are confronted with a crisis. Some of these responses will be discussed in our next blog. Private travel is only part of the transport task however and in some ways is the easiest to address. The challenges confronting freight and essential services to achieve zero emissions are much more difficult and more critical.

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Transforming Melbourne for a zero emission world

Melbourne must, like all cities adapt to the changing world around us and this includes the need to achieve zero emissions within a decade. At this stage we don’t know what a zero emission world looks like, let alone how to get there and the transformation required, but a brief view of the transport industry may provide some clues of the extent of the challenge.

A zero emission transport sector will require the removal of all fossil powered vehicles. This includes trucks of all sorts, buses, diesel trains, service vehicles of all kinds, emergency vehicles including ambulances and fire engines, rubbish trucks and so on, cars, aeroplanes, shipping, industrial equipment, farm vehicles and machinery(1). Most of these have no ready zero emission replacement. In many cases the infrastructure required is not available or the technology solutions required are poorly developed or not even apparent. Even if there was one, supply lines and delivery times may be long in a globally competitive environment and the cost to replace them will be considerable. Production will also have to be carried out in an emission and resource constrained environment, which in itself poses huge challenges, and there will be similar challenges disposing of the existing fleet.

Under these constraints the ability to replace the existing transport fleet within a decade is near impossible and we can expect a substantial short fall. This in turn will force severe rationing of vehicles which may prioritise vehicles of greatest importance. This will include essential services and freight for food (2) and other essentials. It will also require major changes in consumer lifestyles which force people to travel less, less often and more efficiently. For personal travel there are few options. Public transport is limited and will never have the capacity to take up the slack and many trips that were previously done by car will have to be done by active transport. This has huge implications for the majority of the city’s population who are car dependent, living in suburbs remote from shops and other essential services and where public transport is poor or non-existent.

The above assumes to some extent continuation of business as usual, that people will continue to live in these poorly serviced areas and have similar jobs. It is inevitable however this will not be the case. Many industries will fail in the changing environment. The airline industry will almost certainly be one of these. This industry is already struggling because of covid and this alone may force its demise, but the technology to create a zero-emission industry does not exist and may never do so and even if it did, the economics may be unsustainable.

This is only one example of a sunset industry. There will be many others that fail in the race to achieve a zero emission world. It is inevitable that new industries will emerge and replace some that fail in the meantime but it is not clear what these will be and where they will be located. This will in turn change people’s life styles and where they live. It will also determine their travel needs and the demand for goods and services and the way they are delivered. There will be flow on effects for supporting infrastructure: the need for it in the first place and the way is it designed and used and managed. The implications for food production, essential services and freight are even more compelling and there appear to be no simple or single fix solutions.

Despite this, solutions must be found and very quickly. What should be apparent is that achieving a zero emission world will require nothing short of a radical transformation for Melbourne as a city and in a way few people imagine. Traditional concepts of sustainability and “the sustainable city” and notions of best practice to achieve it will become irrelevant. The issue will become one of survival and politically fraught. The burden of change will fall most heavily on those who can least afford it and the number, which is already large will increase as the gap between rich and poor increases even further. The burden will also be felt by those who are financially vulnerable, particularly car dependent families with big mortgages and those who cannot find work when their jobs disappear.

Politicians continue to ignore the science, as they have done for more than thirty years despite growing evidence that scientists’ worst fears are being realised. If politicians continue to ignore the warnings or fail to act with the urgency and commitment required the situation will become dire and increasingly ungovernable. Despite this, politicians appear more concerned about their own future and being re-elected, using policies designed to maintain business as usual and promote the illusion that everything will be alright to keep people happy, knowing that bad news does not sell. The reality is there is no good news here – it is bad but could be far worse depending on the choices we make now. The right choice would be to accept the need to achieve zero emissions by 2030 or even earlier and if was the case it is likely the scenario outlined above could play out. If the government fails to do this we can expect business as usual to continue for a few more years but end up with a crunch point of far greater severity and an irreversible hothouse trajectory that would result in global temperatures rising rapidly by five or six degrees or more over this century.

Perhaps we should not be surprised by the lack of a positive response by politicians or the community in general. Human history is littered with stories of the collapse of cities and civilisations and is a story that has been repeated over many thousands of years. Invariably the underlying reason was environmental. Jared Diamond has identified five main reasons for past failures which include:

  1. failure to anticipate a problem (no previous experience, no science)

  2. failure to perceive a problem in progress (no measurements, too complex to observe)

  3. failure to attempt a solution (rational, bad behaviour) rational for vested interests to maintain their dominance

  4. failure to change bad values (irrational behaviour, societal values entrenched)

  5. failure to change other irrational behaviour including psychological denial

In the current situation we have the science and can measure it but the other three continue to dominate. These points were made at a presentation by Dr Graham Turner (CSIRO) at the Sustainable Cities Sustainable Transport forum in 2009, and he concluded with the following comments:

  • There are success stories of avoiding collapse, but very few within isolated systems

  • There is a very common recourse to using technology, rather than changing behaviour

  • It appears that we (modern society) have progressed SLOWLY along the road map toward addressing our global problems

  • But we now appear to be potentially in the last stage: solution unlikely

The challenge is to prove him wrong.


(1) Transport is Australia’s third largest emitter (19%) and emissions have increased by 22% since 2005. Road transport makes up the bulk at 84.2%, with domestic aviation 8.4%. Passenger vehicles (cars) contribute more than half of road transport emissions with continuing growth reflecting population growth and increased travel overall, as well as increased fuel consumption due to a switch to heavier, less fuel-efficient vehicles. It is not clear whether this figure includes emissions generated from the construction, maintenance etc of supporting infrastructure.

(2) The food industry is the fourth largest emitter of greenhouse gases (approx. 14%) and faces huge challenges of its own to achieve zero emissions at a time when climate change will make growing food increasing difficult.

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Lack of a Transport Plan Slammed by the VAGO

Transport for Melbourne (TfM) and other well qualified transport forums have been constantly reminding the State government of the need for a transport plan. This is mandated under the Transport Integration Act (TIA), so we are relieved that at long last the Victorian Government Audit Office has finally taken the government to task.

However this has fallen on deaf ears and the government continues to insist it has a plan. TfM would respectfully point out that a series of schemes that were developed independently does not constitute a plan. If the government has a plan it needs to tell us what it is, but it is important the government be reminded what constitutes a plan in the context of the TIA. Ultimately it is the quality and relevance of the plan that matters and that is a governance issue.

Quoting from the Transport Integration Act

The transport plan must—

(a)  set the planning framework within which transport bodies are to operate;

(b)  set out the strategic policy context for transport;

(c)  include medium to long term strategic directions, priorities and actions;

(d)  be prepared having regard to the vision statement, transport system objectives and decision making principles;

(e) be prepared having regard to national transport and infrastructure priorities;

(f) demonstrate an integrated approach to transport and land use planning;

(g) identify the challenges that the transport plan seeks to address;

(h) include a short term action plan that is regularly updated.

Almost all of the above are ignored by the current government. The government’s plan comprises an ad-hoc bunch of mega infrastructure projects including the Big Build program and others and a handful of strategies developed by the Department of Transport for different elements of the transport portfolio some of which are poorly developed. There is no vision to guide the plan, or strategic policy context apart from using it to create jobs and win government at the next election, and no attempt to identify the challenges facing us in the future. Government planning remains based largely on the continuation of business as usual.

It was clear from our last TfM forum, The Future We Must Plan For, it will not be business as usual. Covid has demonstrated the vulnerability of our economy and how quickly it can be disrupted. This event is only one of many that is likely to impact our economy and our way of life in the future. The latest IPCC report should be a stark reminder that the future we must plan for is changing rapidly. It will be dominated by environmental change and become a very different world to the one we live in today. This must be reflected in transport planning. The State government’s Big Build program does not anticipate any of this and as a consequence will ultimately result in stranded assets that have no value in the future and a burden of debt.

The absence of a properly constituted plan prescribed by the TIA is a concern but of even greater concern is the lack of checks and balances and proper process by which it has been progressed.

A transport plan must be developed and implemented in a way that is transparent, and follow processes which ensure its integrity and accountability. This requires a framework for assessing and ranking programs and projects in terms of their contribution to the “vision”.

It is critical that priority is given to actions that deliver the greatest return. Such actions are not confined to formal programs or projects. They may include policy and regulatory change, changes in works practices which can result in improvements in operational efficiency and improved customer service that generate better outcomes.

Achieving these goals may require recruitment and training supported by appropriate organisational structures to ensure government is provided with high quality advice and skills to develop and implement policy and ensure proper process is carried out, conducted in an environment which encourages communication of frank and fearless advice to government based on best practice. There is plenty of scope for improvement in this area; it would be a good place to start and that should be part of the plan.

These actions can provide the basis for the development of formal programs and projects funded from working expenses or capital budgets but again the priority must be given to those which generate the highest return on investment.

TfM has long held the view that governments should focus first on the existing “system” and its supporting infrastructure and make it as good as possible before building new. There is no shortage of transport infrastructure, but much of it is poorly maintained, in need of renewal and not used efficiently. This is a critical issue but needs to be addressed as part of the plan and funded accordingly.

Maintenance is usually funded from recurrent budgets instead of capital. It also tends to be tightly constrained so there is pressure to do more with less and focus on measurable outcomes. Investment in this area is therefore likely to be well targeted, yield high rates of return on investment as well as being subjected to a high level of scrutiny and accountability.

Benefits from capital works projects are more difficult to assess and have the potential to be subject to political influence or used for political purposes. Benefits also take longer to be realised, sometimes many years, often long after the minister or government responsible for the project has moved on. This makes it more difficult to audit and hold those responsible to account. As a general rule returns on capital investment vary inversely with the size and cost of the project and mega infrastructure projects have a particularly poor record. The Westgate Tunnel project is a good example but there are plenty more in the government’s Big Build pipeline.

Despite these problems capital works projects continue to dominate transport planning today in terms of publicity and budget allocations, and for many, particularly politicians, perceived to be the essence of a transport plan today.

It is argued that investment in capital infrastructure can be a lazy way to address transport problems. It promotes a mindset that says problems can be solved simply by throwing money at it without the need to understand the business itself and how it can be improved. This mindset is often reinforced by the belief that the bigger and more expensive the project the better the outcome. Under this scenario it is little wonder transport outcomes in this State have been so poor for so many years. This will continue so long as governments prioritise the least efficient and least effective measures to improve our transport system ie capital investment, particularly in major infrastructure projects whilst ignoring or underfunding far more effective mechanisms outlined above.

VAGO is absolutely right to criticise the State government for not having a transport plan. However TfM’s greatest concern is the quality and relevance of the plan and the political environment in which it is created. It is also important that transport planning not exist in a vacuum and must reflect broader environmental obligations including global emission reduction targets which must also be achieved for the transport system as a whole. This must be included in the transport plan and given top priority. All of this requires political leadership, courage, good governance and the environment required to create it. Achieving this will require fundamental changes of a systemic nature – without this we cannot expect better transport outcomes.

The importance of good governance has been highlighted by the covid pandemic. Governments at both State and Federal levels have been forced to listen to medical experts and appropriate institutional structures have existed for them to provide advice. For the most part this advice has been accepted but there have been occasions when politicians have ignored it thinking they knew better, and we have seen the consequences measured in loss of life.

Unfortunately political respect for independent expert advice does not always extend to government departments, which have often become politicised. Too often government ministers and their too commonly unqualified advisors think they know best and poorly treat those who should be providing them with expert advice. This is reflected in poor outcomes, not just in transport but all government portfolios. Addressing this will become increasingly critical if we are to have any success in responding to the challenges that lie ahead, particularly those driven by climate and environmental change.

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WestGate Tunnel Project Another “Big Build” Disaster

This project was always a disaster waiting to happen. It is a terrible project and should never have been contemplated let alone built in the first place. It was not part of any transport plan, although to be fair the State government does not have a plan. It is just a project bowled up to the State government by Transurban, an unsolicited bid designed to strengthened its position as a toll road operator, which the government bought because it helped its image of getting on with the job and would create jobs in the construction industry. The case against it is included in the papers section on this web site and have referred to it in an earlier blog.

Lack of feasibility studies and planning was always problematic and has doomed this project. Like all mega infrastructure projects promoted by the State government today, they are rushed to suit political objectives and tenders are called before the design work is carried out. It is a bit like quoting to build a house when you have no idea what the building will look like or the ground conditions on which it will be built. The risk is huge and must be built into the tender price. Everyone knew or should have known that the ground through which the tunnel was to be bored would be heavily contaminated but this was never properly tested so it is no surprise this has become a serious issue and stalled the project at enormous cost.

Quoting Timna Jacks and Patric Hatch “The Age has confirmed with sources close to the project that the joint building venture, CPB Contractors and John Holland, is claiming the project has blown out by as much as $5.2 billion. The dispute centres on the handling of about 3 million tonnes of soil, with an unknown portion of it believed to be contaminated with perand polyfluoroalkyl chemicals – the potential carcinogens known as PFAS”. “PFAS” is so toxic there is no safe way to dispose it but the State government is trying to have it reclassified as a less toxic chemical and has been struggling to find a site where it can be safely stored.

So who is going to pay for this costly mess? The premier has rightly argued that this was not the government’s project “ Transurban came to the government with this project, they chose the builder so they need to sort it out with the builder”. But will it end up like the East West Link where the government ended up paying more than $1billion to cancel the contract after declaring that it could be cancelled at little or no cost?

Whatever the outcome we the broader community will be the losers. Apart from the waste of public funds on a project we don’t need, the opportunity cost of not investing in projects and programs of real need is huge. But perhaps the greatest cost will be ongoing failure of governance, absence of proper process, lack of integrity and breach of public trust. These issues have been nomalised under this government and we will continue to pay a huge price if they are not addressed.

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Achieving Zero Transport Emissions. Where is the plan?

Scientists are telling us we must achieve zero emissions – not by 2050, or 2040 but by 2030. But this will not happen on its own and cannot be left to the “market”. It needs a plan.

A transport plan is already mandated under the Transport Integration Act and whilst it acknowledges the need to respond, prepare and adapt to the challenges presented by climate change and improve the environmental performance of all forms of transport and the forms of energy used in transport, these provisions are merely passing comments and paid lip service by government in an Act which focuses to a large extent on business as usual. Despite the provisions of the Act we still don’t have a transport plan, let alone one that acknowledges the urgent need to respond to our climate emergency. This must change if government is to have any hope of achieving a zero emission target by 2030.

From a transport perspective the urgency is clear and compelling. As noted in an earlier blog zero emissions means no more petrol/diesel or natural gas driven motor vehicles of any kind for personal, business travel and freight (land, sea and air), industry including tractors and other machinery for agricultural purposes. It also includes the embedded energy in the construction, maintenance and renewal of supporting infrastructure. This is a huge challenge and requires a transformation in our transport industry.

But transport is a “derived demand”, a function of the economy it services so the starting point must be to get a better understanding of what a zero emission world will look like. This means the social and economic activities and number of people it will support. We need to ask what jobs will have value (and which ones will disappear), where will they be located? More specifically how and where will food be grown and processed, and other essential goods and services transported in a zero emission world? What will be the social and economic impact on businesses that provide them and the flow on effect for the broader economy? What will their transport/travel needs be and how these be met, and cost implications remembering the vast majority of people in Melbourne are car dependent? It has implications for many energy intensive industries and others such as the tourist industry with its heavy dependence on the airline industry which will have great difficulty achieving zero emissions and most likely no place in a zero emission world. All of this must be reflected in transport policies and strategies and the infrastructure required to support it. It is almost certain much of the infrastructure existing today or being built will become irrelevant, redundant or require repurposing.

Whilst 2030 should be seen as an end point, achieving it will require milestone targets for earlier years. There are opportunities to make significant emission reductions now. This was the finding by Stanley et al in their paper “Reducing Australian motor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions” published in 2006, which estimated possible reductions of 40% using a range of measures based on technological improvements and behavioural change. This analysis does not include a whole of life assessment for the transport fleet or supporting infrastructure so it is an overestimate but it would be a significant start.

Achieving this reduction will not be easy of course. The authors recognise these gains would be quickly eroded by population and economic growth and inappropriate land use planning and development that promotes more travel and longer trips. It has also been eroded by transport projects such as new motorways that promote more travel, mostly by motorised vehicles – cars and trucks etc. And it also requires political support and intervention. Whilst measures proposed in the report are conventional – certainly not radical, there has been little or no action since the report was written. Yet achieving 40% reduction should be the easy bit: getting to zero will be far more challenging and require fundamental system change.

The challenge to make it happen within the existing political system is huge. It raises fundamental questions about our society, its values, aspirations and the choices it is prepared to make and there will be considerable resistance to change. Despite this it is clear that when a crisis is identified, strong leadership from government can result in widespread community support and rapid change, including community values and behaviour and a willingness to make sacrifices.

This was clearly demonstrated by the federal government’s initial response to the Covid pandemic and later by the state government’s response to the second wave in Victoria in which the top priority was to survive and do whatever it takes to achieve it. It resulted in major restructuring of government departments responsible for public health, upgrading procedures and technological advances. It is now run like a “war office” with strong linkages to other state governments and internationally. The pandemic has also demonstrated the capacity for rapid technological advances – in vaccines, and timescales, previously measured in decades to less than a year. But it is a reminder that all of this has been driven by leadership at the political level and its capacity to create an environment for change – not by the ‘market”. It is also a reminder that government should never delegate this kind of task to market forces as has so often been the case in the past.

The challenge now is to harness this energy and leadership to respond to our climate emergency. Governments have demonstrated that when they are willing to listen to the science and science experts radical change is possible, but they must get the priorities right and start working to goals and targets with a plan to achieve them. It really is a race against time. They must also do so based on the understanding that we require a combination of technological advances and behavioural change, that technology must be directed to support behavioural change, not used for its own sake for commercial interests, recognising that on its own technology will make matters worse.

There are many challenges that remain unresolved. Currently the footprint for EV’s is higher than conventional internal combustion vehicles so major improvements are required to address this, particularly for batteries to increase their efficiency, reduce their environmental footprint and make them more easily recycled at the end of their economic life. There are encouraging signs with the development of hydride batteries and their potential use in many transport modes, farm machinery and fixed power generation but this needs a plan and must become an integral part of a new “circular economy”. It must also be accompanied by programs that promote behavioural change. In the case of transport, this means to travel less, less often and more efficiently, particularly using travel modes such as active transport which have minimal environment footprints. There is little to be gained if EV’s simply replace the existing fleet in a way that promotes business as usual and leave it to market forces to determine the outcome.

These are questions that should have been addressed decades ago when scientists and others started warning us of the impending climate emergency. Time is fast running out and the time to act is now. The scale and complexity of the challenge is huge. Prof Rockstrom (Director Potsdam Institute of Climate Impact Research, Germany) has described the task as another Apollo project designed to get man on the moon or beyond and here is less than a decade to make the transition. Failure to achieve this and put this planet on a hothouse trajectory is unthinkable and must be rejected. So where is the plan?

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Achieving Zero Transport Emissions. Why Electric Vehicles are not the Answer

We have expressed concern about politicians’ faith in technology to solve our environmental problems. This is shared by many transport professionals who seem convinced that technological developments in the form of electric vehicles will be a large part of the transport “solution”. But the argument is heavily flawed. The best way to compare emissions for electric vehicles is to assess all phases of the life cycle.

This has been reviewed in an article from the Conversation which has allowed us to post on our blog by Md Arif Hasan, PhD, PhD candidate, Te Herenga Waka — Victoria University of Wellington and Ralph Brougham Chapman Associate Professor , Director Environmental Studies, Te Herenga Waka — Victoria University of Wellington.

There is a lot of discussion on the benefits of electric cars versus fossil fuel cars in the context of lithium mining. Please can you tell me which one weighs in better on the environmental impact in terms of global warming and why?

Electric vehicles (EVs) seem very attractive at first sight. But when we look more closely, it becomes clear that they have a substantial carbon footprint and some downsides in terms of the extraction of lithium, cobalt and other metals. And they don’t relieve congestion in crowded cities.

In this response to the question, we touch briefly on the lithium issue, but focus mainly on the carbon footprint of electric cars.

The increasing use of lithium-ion batteries as a major power source in electronic devices, including mobile phones, laptops and electric cars has contributed to a 58% increase in lithium mining in the past decade worldwide. There seems little near-term risk of lithium being mined out, but there is an environmental downside.

The mining process requires extensive amounts of water, which can cause aquifer depletion and adversely affect ecosystems in the Atacama Salt Flat, in Chile, the world’s largest lithium extraction site. But researchers have developed methods to recover lithium from water.

Turning to climate change, it matters whether electric cars emit less carbon than conventional vehicles, and how much less.

Emissions reduction potential of EVs

The best comparison is based on a life cycle analysis which tries to consider all the emissions of carbon dioxide during vehicle manufacturing, use and recycling. Life cycle estimates are never entirely comprehensive, and emission estimates vary by country, as circumstances differ.

In New Zealand, 82% of energy for electricity generation came from renewable sources in 2017. With these high renewable electricity levels for electric car recharging, compared with say Australia or China, EVs are better suited to New Zealand. But this is only one part of the story. One should not assume that, overall, electric cars in New Zealand have a close- to-zero carbon footprint or are wholly sustainable.

A life cycle analysis of emissions considers three phases: the manufacturing phase (also known as cradle-to-gate), the use phase (well-to-wheel) and the recycling phase (grave-to-cradle).

The manufacturing phase

In this phase, the main processes are ore mining, material transformation, manufacturing of vehicle components and vehicle assembly. A recent
study of car emissions in China estimates emissions for cars with internal combustion engines in this phase to be about 10.5 tonnes of carbon dioxide (tCO2) per car, compared to emissions for an electric car of about 13 tonnes (including the electric car battery manufacturing).

Emissions from the manufacturing of a lithium-nickel-manganese-cobalt- oxide battery alone were estimated to be 3.2 tonnes. If the vehicle life is assumed to be 150,000 kilometres, emissions from the manufacturing phase of an electric car are higher than for fossil-fuelled cars. But for complete life cycle emissions, the study shows that EV emissions are 18%
lower than fossil-fuelled cars.

The use phase

In the use phase, emissions from an electric car are solely due to its upstream emissions, which depend on how much of the electricity comes from fossil or renewable sources. The emissions from a fossil-fuelled car are due to both upstream emissions and tailpipe emissions.

Upstream emissions of EVs essentially depend on the share of zero or low- carbon sources in the country’s electricity generation mix. To understand how the emissions of electric cars vary with a country’s renewable electricity share, consider Australia and New Zealand.

In 2018, Australia’s share of renewables in electricity generation was about 21% (similar to Greece’s at 22%). In contrast, the share of renewables in New Zealand’s electricity generation mix was about 84% (less than France’s at 90%). Using these data and estimates from a 2018 assessment, electric car upstream emissions (for a battery electric vehicle) in Australia can be estimated to be about 170g of CO2 per km while upstream emissions in New Zealand are estimated at about 25g of CO2 per km on average. This shows that using an electric car in New Zealand is likely to be about seven times better in terms of upstream carbon emissions than in Australia.

The above studies show that emissions during the use phase from a fossil- fuelled compact sedan car were about 251g of CO2 per km. Therefore, the use phase emissions from such a car were about 81g of CO2 per km higher than those from a grid-recharged EV in Australia, and much worse than the emissions from an electric car in New Zealand.

The recycling phase

The key processes in the recycling phase are vehicle dismantling, vehicle recycling, battery recycling and material recovery. The estimated emissions in this phase, based on a study in China, are about 1.8 tonnes for a fossil- fuelled car and 2.4 tonnes for an electric car (including battery recycling). This difference is mostly due to the emissions from battery recycling which is 0.7 tonnes.

This illustrates that electric cars are responsible for more emissions than their petrol counterparts in the recycling phase. But it’s important to note the recycled vehicle components can be used in the manufacturing of future vehicles, and batteries recycled through direct cathode recycling can be used in subsequent batteries. This could have significant emissions reduction benefits in the future.

So on the basis of recent studies, fossil-fuelled cars generally emit more than electric cars in all phases of a life cycle. The total life cycle emissions from a fossil-fuelled car and an electric car in Australia were 333g of CO2 per km and 273g of CO2 per km, respectively. That is, using average grid electricity, EVs come out about 18% better in terms of their carbon footprint.

Likewise, electric cars in New Zealand work out a lot better than fossil- fuelled cars in terms of emissions, with life-cycle emissions at about 333 g of CO2 per km for fossil-fuelled cars and 128g of CO2 per km for electric cars. In New Zealand, EVs perform about 62% better than fossil cars in carbon footprint terms.

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Activating Public Planning

https://www.e-elgar.com/shop/gbp/being-a-planner-in-society-9781788973786.html


Having written Being a Planner in Society and its Companion Website I ask myself, ‘what do I want planning to be’? I have an answer, but it is a question for all readers of the book. If I were still teaching urban and environmental planning, I would put that question to my students. More important than my answer is the debates which I believe should today take place around that kind of questioning. I’m hoping the theoretical exploration in my book may throw some light on the matter.

My answer is that I want planning to become a social movement again, to find again its transformative origins, to invent new ways of designing our human response to the environment for the better, and to re-join social with environmental transformation. All this is in light of the experience of planning in theory and practice that we have gained over the last hundred or so years.

However, to do that, to reinstate planning, that is public planning by the democratic state, we need to understand what has gone wrong with the so-called neoliberal model of governance. As I explain in my book, and further illustrated in the companion website, the balance of power over the detailed making and implementation of policy has been transferred from a competent, professional public service, with clear lines of accountability, depth of expertise and longstanding experience, to a political tier with an intense but shallow focus on the political cycle.

 In Australia the unbalanced empowerment of political control has led to a diffusion of accountability in which ‘cabinets’ consisting of most of the senior politicians are put collectively in charge of almost everything important. The drive for privatization has diminished the permanent public service and outsourced many functions which properly belong within government to private firms with no public accountability under contracts, sub-contracts and complex but ineffective regulation.

This process has been going on now at federal and state levels for at least thirty years. Senior economists, political scientists and journalists have complained about it. Thus Laura Tingle in 2015, then political editor of the Australian Financial Review, wrote that ‘we have forgotten how to govern’. John Hewson (economist and former leader of the Liberal Party) writes, ‘The public service has been effectively denuded of essential talent by years of spending cuts and efficiency dividends – many departments are now referred to as gutted shells’. Even the former Labour Treasurer and Prime Minister, Paul Keating, who initially embraced neo-liberalisation on behalf of the Labour Party declared in 2017 that ‘liberal economics has run into a dead end and has had no answer to the contemporary malaise’.

Many people in leadership positions now know that neo-liberalisation has produced a failed system of governance. And it is a governance model created by ideology not an economic model. But because of the path dependence of both institutions and ideas in Australia, nothing is being done to change it. Its failure was on show in July 2020 as the State of Victoria suffered a huge (by Australian standards) second wave of coronavirus.

Through concerted and swift police action to ‘lock down’ the whole country, Australia had been initially successful in containing the spread of the virus, closing all opportunities for people to gather or even leave their homes, with few exceptions. Returning travellers from overseas were forced to isolate in designated hotels for fourteen days. So successful was this ‘suppression’ strategy that when caseloads went right down, governments started to ease the restrictions to get back to something like normality.

However in late June 2020 an outbreak of infections occurred in quarantine hotels in Melbourne. Guards contracted the virus from the confined travellers and, because restrictions on movement and gathering were by then relaxed, the infected guards went home to their families and friends, who became infected in turn. The virus then spread rapidly throughout Melbourne suburbs. The result was a second wave of coronavirus in Australia (with up to 400 cases and three or four deaths per day), centred in Melbourne, much greater than the first wave.

The piecemeal response of the government of Victoria was first to lock down certain postcodes and high-rise public housing blocks where the virus appeared. When that didn’t work to contain the spread, whole municipalities were ordered into lock down, then the whole of metropolitan Melbourne. Now (mid-July) cases are increasing outside the metropolitan region.

It’s easy to blame the Premier of Victoria for this outbreak. But, in an emergency, politicians operate within the established governance model. In keeping with the neoliberal model of outsourcing, contracts were given to private security companies to provide hotel guards. In some cases it appears that these companies further subcontracted the tasks, ending up with virtually untrained and unprotected casual workers in close contact with infected returned travellers.

Casual work has grown from about 13 per cent of the workforce in the 1980s to around 25 per cent in 2020. Casual workers, assumed to be self-employed, now form a permanent, highly exploited, tier of the labour force without the rights accorded to employees. They include aged care workers, Uber drivers, hospital and school cleaners, bar tenders, security guards, abattoir workers and even university staff (averaging 40 per cent of staff). Many have several jobs on the go.

Outsourcing plus casualization of labour is the underlying cause of the outbreak. A government without depth of policy capacity and clear lines of accountability in the public service has proved unable to manage the pandemic, adopting the stop-start approach of suppression rather than elimination, which is both feasible and in the long run less economically damaging. The government has refused to acknowledge the systemic failure, tossing the issue to a public inquiry that will not report until September.

The Covid19 event is an existential crisis. Governments around the world had been warned that a devastating pandemic was likely to occur, just as they have been warned that global heating will have catastrophic consequences. But the absence of public planning for people, planet and places has left citizens at risk of death and disability, and economies in danger of destruction.

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How Neoliberalism Mutated into Crony Capitalism

https://www.e-elgar.com/shop/gbp/being-a-planner-in-society-9781788973786.html


Let’s be clear. Whatever system of economic governance dominates the world today, it is not pure neoliberalism. It is better described as crony capitalism, which is opposed to the agenda of those like Friedrich Hayek who started the neoliberal ball rolling. Neoliberalism has mutated into crony capitalism with devastating results for economic growth and social justice, endangering the health and welfare of entire societies.

Crony capitalism has been around in some form or another since the beginning of capitalism itself. I can’t do better than cite the definition in Wikipedia: ‘an economic system in which businesses thrive not as a result of risk, but rather as a return on money amassed through a nexus between a business class and the political class’.

The evidence of crony capitalism is abundant over the globe, from Trump’s America to Xi Jinping’s China and Bolsonaro’s Brazil. In Australia its resurgence is recorded in a book called Game of Mates, How Favours Bleed the Nation by economists Cameron Murray and Paul Frijters, in Dead Right: How neoliberalism ate itself and what comes next (‘Quarterly Essay’ by Richard Denniss), and in On Fairness by Sally McManus. I provide a few examples in Being a Planner in Society.

Hayek in his book Law, Legislation and Liberty conceived of an economic governance system in which ‘law precedes legislation’. ‘Law’, governing the behaviour of the market economy, would be determined by a legislative assembly consisting of wise elders (over 45 years old) serving electoral terms of fifteen years. Their election would not be subject to universal suffrage, and anyone receiving any benefits from the state (pensions, unemployment benefits, government salaries) would be automatically excluded from voting. Hayek’s plan was to set up a governing authority beyond political control to prevent elected politicians interfering with the market.

This position was later reinforced by the work of Milton Friedman, and the public choice theorists. As I observe in my book, politics, so it is argued by the public choice theorists, is nothing more than a game in which political actors (inside and outside government) maximise their short term advantage through ‘log-rolling’ bargains’. That cynical view became self-fulfilling.

The problem for the neoliberals is that electoral politics refused to go away, for the simple reason that people value universal suffrage that holds governments to account. The political class therefore continued to hold power even while they paid lip service to neoliberalism. The political class, even in manipulated democracies like Russia today, enjoy their power and legitimacy and work hard to maintain it. So the governance system we have today is a hybrid between corporate economic power supported by antidemocratic neoliberal ideology and political power supported by universal suffrage: that is crony capitalism. This result was what Hayek regarded as ‘the worst of both worlds’: political intervention with private corporate production.

Then came a theoretical spawn of neoliberalism called New Public Management. The ideology of NPM can be interpreted in different ways. It provided a salutary critique of sclerotic bureaucracies that had become distanced from the publics they served, hence ‘customer service’ became a byword for NPM but that admirable goal covered something more sinister. The scope and ambition of NPM is breathtaking;

New Public Management (NPM) is part of the managerial revolution that has gone around the world, affecting all countries, though to considerably different degrees. The theory of new public management contains insights from game theory and from the disciplines of law and economics. … The theoretical background of NPM is to be found in the strong criticism of a large public sector, to be found in the public choice school as well as Chicago School Economics, both attacking since the mid-1960s prevailing notions about public sector governance (Lane, 2000: 3).

There is not space here to undertake a critique of NPM (which is, incidentally, a major lacuna in my book). But the introduction by Lane makes clear the link with neoliberal ideology which I do address in the book. The essentials of NPM are these: the use of quasi-market structures for delivery of services, contracting out of government functions to private firms, setting performance targets and continual monitoring of performance, handing over power to senior management executives, replacing trained personnel in professions relevant to the government function (e.g. public health, environmental conservation, city planning, building regulation) with generalists trained in ‘management’. What this management training in fact amounts to is in-depth indoctrination in neoliberal ideology. Some of the Australian environment and planning failures to which I refer in the on-line Appendix can arguably be traced to the replacement of professionals in senior management by generalist managers. Of course the issue is far from simple, but this is a hypothesis that at least deserves to be thoroughly researched.

Hayek’s proposal to suspend universal suffrage, with society run by a largely unaccountable State, which is at the heart of neoliberal doctrine, was dangerous nonsense from the start. But its design to suspend the struggle for equality was adopted by Regan, Thatcher and a multitude of think tanks funded by corporate wealth. Neoliberalism quickly mutated into class warfare with suppression of the trades unions, vilification and abuse of the unemployed, massive cuts to the public service, and transfer of wealth from the poorest to the richest in society. The end result, as we now know, was not long term economic growth but miserly hoarding of wealth piled into tax havens and stock markets: the misereconomy. Crony capitalism is only one short step away from fascism, with populist politicians seizing the moment to limit democratic restraints in order to stay in power. We know where that ends.

The Canadian philosopher John Rawlston Saul saw what was happening twenty years ago. What he called ‘anti-government government’ created a ‘false populist model’. Think of Thatcher’s talk of ‘rolling back the state’, Trump’s talk of ‘draining the swamp’ and, even today’s ‘deep state’ conspiracy theories. Citing Mussolini’s rise to power, Saul remarks, ‘No matter how big and structured the Fascist Party became, it always declared itself to be the voice of anti-party, anti-government politics’.

The examples of crony capitalism in action today come thick and fast in that sector of the daily press that is not devoted to class warfare on behalf of corporate power. Commentators of the independent press in Australia are almost unanimous in ascribing the cause of the second surge in Covid 19 to the impoverishment of the casual workforce, lack of sick leave and poverty-level unemployment relief forcing workers to go on working when they are ill, the privatised system of aged care, and the lack of depth of government response. That is what has now caused 810 deaths and counting, in Victoria, destroyed the health of many survivors, and ruined the economy.

The crony-capitalist governance model as exhibited in Australia, has resulted in corruption of urban and regional planning in which deals are done between developers and governments to enrich the latter at the stroke of a pen. A huge area of Melbourne was converted from industrial to residential zoning without any provision for open space or educational and health services. Companies linked to the government of the day made millions from the increase in land value. Vast road building projects are signed off with private companies to enrich the latter at the expense of the public interest.

Failures of building regulation, outsourced to private firms, have resulted in hundreds of tower blocks being covered in flammable cladding. The weakly regulated private recycling industry has resulted in flammable material stored in huge warehouses, catching fire and belching toxic smoke over residential areas. After much of Beirut was destroyed by an explosion of ammonium nitrate, Australian journalists started nervously looking for stores of this chemical, and found a stockpile in Newcastle, New South Wales, four times the size of the stock in Beirut. Where? Just three kilometres from Newcastle’s CBD.

Hayek wanted to take power away from politicians. Crony capitalism shares power between the political class and the corporate sector. The Australian governance failures that have occurred since the 1990s have many sources: incompetence of a poorly organised and depleted public service, continued class warfare on working people and the unemployed, shameful environmental policy, mental cruelty to refugees, institutional paternalism, sexism and racism. No governance model is mono-causal and ‘pure’. But the current governance model has strayed far from liberalism, whether old or new.

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More on Governance

TfM has become increasingly concerned about the declining standards of governance at the political and institutional level within all levels of government. As noted in an earlier blog, poor governance is the main reason we have consistently achieved poor transport outcomes in Melbourne and Victoria generally but it is a complex issue with no simple solutions. Many of the problems have their roots in political thinking/dogma which can be very difficult to change. Three papers will be included in our blog over the next week by President Nick Low to provide a better understanding of this issue. These include: The Dysfunction of ‘New Public Management’, a lesson from Covid 19, How neoliberalism mutated into crony capitalism andActivating Public Planning. The first of these is included in this blog.


https://www.e-elgar.com/shop/gbp/being-a-planner-in-society-9781788973786.html

The global experience of planning the response to the Covid 19 pandemic has revealed many failures of governance across the nations, both failures of political leadership and failures of the neo-liberal institutional models that govern policy making in the 21st Century.

The death of neo-liberal economics occurred in 2008 with the GFC. But its zombie-like ghost remained to haunt governance. The post-mortem has only just begun – most recently with the work of Kay and King (2020) – though the sickness was foreshadowed much earlier. The work of forensic examination of the corpse must continue to identify specifics of ‘organ failure’. In what follows I examine one such failure.

New Public Management

The particular neo-liberal organ of governance I examine is called ‘New Public Management’ (NPM). NPM is a theory of public sector management whose assumptions are built on the axioms of the Chicago school concerning human behaviour and its motivation. These axioms of ‘rationality’ are critically discussed at length by Kay and King (2020, e.g. p. 110 et seq. ‘The triumph of the American school’). The central axiom of the ‘American school’ is that individuals always seek to maximise their own ‘utility’. Further, the benign social outcome of utility-maximising individuals is only achieved through the free market. The precise connection between NPM and the Chicago School is too complex to address here. But it is important to note one observation of Kay and King which is relevant to what follows. The authors say, ‘Our brains are not built like computers but as adaptive mechanisms for making connections and recognising patterns. Good decisions often result from leaps of the imagination.’ (ibid: 47). With NPM there was a failure to imagine what is needed to protect the population of the State of Victoria, Australia, from the spread of the virus from returning travellers.

The central assumptions of NPM are as follows.

  • Professional experts in fields relevant to public policy are self-interested in promoting policies and understandings of the world that emerge from their professions. Professions are viewed as organised institutions promoting their own self-interest. Thus professional personnel are biased in favour of policy priorities that support their employment and remuneration. Fields of policy can thus become ‘captured’ by professional interests. (Somehow the economics profession has exempted itself from any implication of policy ‘capture’). Instead, people trained in ‘management’ replace professionals in senior executive positions in the public service. Their function is to ‘manage’ what political leaders decide, mostly meaning managing contracts with private sector agents.
  • There is scepticism about any value of ‘the public interest’ other than is demonstrated by market outcomes. Thus, the proposition that a profession might, at least in some important respects, represent the public interest in any particular field is discounted.

  • Only political leaders competing in electoral arenas are capable of devising policies in the public interest. Competition for votes becomes a kind of substitute for competition for customers. Policy making is thus seen as a top-down process, in which policies and their implementation are radically separated. In the words of Jan- Erik Lane (2000: 179), ‘In public policy, the policies government decides centrally are to be implemented either by means of central bureaux steering public employees at lower levels or through wide discretion on the part of policy networks’. Presumably the networks involve public and private sector actors.

These assumptions are simplistic and ideological. They have no basis in scientific observation of human behaviour. They justify the neoliberal programme of deregulation and reduction of the size of the public sector, in short, the hollowing out of the state. They support the desire of the economics profession to reduce economics to mathematical algorithms in order to make it look scientific and politically neutral.

The consequence for public sector management drawn from these assumptions is that the public sector should be structured with three elements: political leaders who decide policies, consultants (typically private sector) who advise political leaders, and managers who implement contracts to embody policies. In what follows I trace the unforeseen consequences of the NPM approach in the public health arena which resulted in a catastrophic failure of planning.

The outbreak of the Covid 19 virus in the State of Victoria, Australia, in 2020

After quite successfully containing the spread of the virus in a ‘first wave’ from March 2020, a second wave of infections hit the State of Victoria in July 2020. 768 people died from this second wave.1 The long term health of many more has been affected. The State was forced into ‘Stage 4’ lockdown which included a curfew between 8.00pm and 5.00am, enforced closure of many businesses, bans on movement beyond five kilometres from home, and compulsory wearing of face masks. The lockdown was enforced for more than three months.

It was established by genomic tracing that all of the second wave of infection originated from two quarantine hotels in which returning travellers were forcibly sequestrated. The virus was spread by hotel security guards who were insufficiently protected from the virus. Businesses suffered and the whole Australian economy was shocked. Political leaders such as Daniel Andrews (Premier of the State of Victoria) must of course accept ultimate responsibility for such a failure, as he has. He quickly announced a public inquiry into the outbreak. The head of the inquiry, Justice Jennifer Coate, reported in November 2020. No individual was found to be responsible. But the root cause lies deeper in the lack of effective planning conducted by Victoria’s public health administration.

In recent years planning for infection control from all sources began with the report by Dr Rosemary Lester published in 2014. Lester is a highly qualified expert in public health and epidemiology. Her report was delivered to the emergency management authority (Emergency Management Victoria). The epidemiological expertise shines through the report. Lester recommended the use of personal protective equipment and training in its use ‘in all health care settings’. Her report was shelved.

Under the name of the Minister for Health, a second planning report was published in March 2020 authored by senior public servants of the Victorian Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). These public servants had no public health or epidemiological background. Their report showed no awareness that the people looking after those quarantined in hotels needed to be equipped as health workers, with appropriate training and personal protective equipment. The report is a managerial document focusing mainly on the (then) three stages of governmental response. It draws heavily on a similarly managerial report from the Federal Department of Health.

In June 2020 an ‘operation’ was devised by DHHS named ‘Soteria’ (after the Greek goddess of rescue). This operation was designed to manage quarantine of returned overseas travellers. The DHHS displayed nothing on its website about the operation, about who devised it or what its aims were. At the public inquiry headed by Justice Coate a sheet ofinstructions to ‘hotel security staff’ emerged: ‘OPERATION SOTERIA, PPE Advice to Hotel Security Staff and AO’s (sic) in Contact with Quarantined Individuals’. It advised that personal protective equipment was not required to be worn by security staff at any point of contact. The latter include the hotel lobby, the quarantine floor, and at doorways to clients’ hotel rooms. Only hand hygiene and surgical masks were ‘recommended’. Hotel quarantine clients (guests) were recommended to wear surgical masks ‘if tolerated’.

It is obvious that this operation did not benefit from epidemiological advice. In evidence to the Coate Inquiry, Professor Lindsay Grayson (Director of the Austin Hospital’s infectious disease department) said that, as well as training in the proper use of masks, security guards at any point of contact with hotel guests should have been dressed in full personal protective equipment (PPE) to the same standard as health workers. It is also common sense. Epidemiological advice should not even have been needed. Everyone who reads a daily newspaper or receives a digital news feed would already have known how infectious this disease was. The report by Rosemary Lester states:

‘The use of appropriate PPE is recommended in all healthcare settings, including primary care and health services. … Where the use of appropriate PPE is recommended the equipment must be suitable and maintained. Appropriate training must be provided to the individual using PPE at a time prior to the pandemic to ensure they become competent and proficient in its use’ (p.48).

The managers of Operation Soteria did not exercise their imagination enough to see that the situation of hotel quarantine was a ‘health care setting’. They followed the normal, easy solution of contracting out peripheral health work to private companies, without first ensuring that the workers were properly trained in the use of protective equipment and suitably supplied.

The Health Department leader of the Covid 19 response decided to spread responsibility for the operation among government bureaucrats including police and emergency services. Lester’s report states, ‘The Chief Health Officer or delegate would assume the role of State Controller and liaise closely with the Emergency Management Commission’. The Chief Health Officer of Victoria was reportedly excluded from taking control.

The private companies sub-contracted the work to labour supply companies employing casual workers. Many of these workers in the so-called ‘gig economy’ had several different jobs on the go. Unprotected from the virus, they contracted disease from returned travellers (or allegedly from a night manager of one of the hotels) and, before they began showing symptoms, spread the virus to their families and to colleagues in other work settings, who in turn became infected and spread the virus further through the community, resulting in an explosion of over 18,000 cases of the virus.

The Head of DHSS at the time had no qualifications in either epidemiology or public health; in fact no qualifications in any branch of health. This person was simply a career bureaucrat with a Masters in public administration. The division of the Department of Health and Human Services responsible for epidemic planning (the division of ‘Regulation, Health Protection and Emergency Management’) was headed by another career bureaucrat. This person was previously Deputy Secretary, Budget and Finance, a ‘Director of the Allen Consulting Group and a partner in Deloittes’.

The Division’s functions are described as bringing together ‘professional and epidemiological expertise to protect the Victorian public from avoidable harm. The daily work of the division brings us in contact with such risks as drugs, poisons, infections, contagions, emergency

incidents and the risks of super bugs and pandemics’. In practice, before the outbreak, health professionals were sidelined and given no control over the planning of the response to Covid 19.

The Coate report found that blame for the outbreak could not be assigned to any individual. Nevertheless the Minister of Health was subsequently dismissed from her position, and later resigned from Parliament. The Head of DHSS resigned to become a partner in the ‘strategy focused’ business consultancy firm EY Port Jackson Partners based in Sydney. The divisional manager was stripped of responsibility for Covid planning. Yet the systemic failure of New Public Management was not noted and the concept continues to operate across all departments of the Government of Victoria.

When cautious steps to contain the outbreak failed, the Government of Victoria took decisive steps to contain the virus by preventing people from congregating and thus transmitting the disease. This strategy, coupled with effective testing and tracing was highly successful. But problems with quarantine hotels have since emerged repeatedly in Australia, resulting in temporary lockdowns. Step by step the State Governments have learned from experience what works and what does not. They are now demanding the establishment of specialist out of town quarantine stations to replace inner city hotels.

This quick learning by local political leaders, trusting epidemiological advice, is what has spared Australia from the worst outcomes of Covid 19. But it is time to reassess the effect of New Public Management, which brought the State of Victoria so close to disaster and cost so many lives. The belief that professionals simply promote their own material interests is wrong. Professionals have interests, of course, specific to their disciplines, but those interests can and often do coincide with the public interest. Public health professionals, for instance, have an interest in and a commitment to public health.

Politicians in a democracy are by definition non-experts. Their job is to represent their constituents. That job cannot include understanding all that is required in any particular field to achieve the public interest. The issues involved are invariably complex and require specific training and knowledge. The politician’s job is to listen to professional expert advice and then decide how to act. Fortunately that is what political leaders in Australia have now learned from Covid 19. The NPM assumption that political leaders can do without professionals in leading roles in the public service has been shown to be wrong.

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Zero emissions – What does that mean for transport?

Zero emissions means no more petrol/diesel or natural gas driven motor vehicles of any kind for personal, business travel and freight (land, sea and air), or industry including tractors and other machinery for agricultural purposes.  It also includes the embedded energy in  the construction, maintenance and renewal of supporting infrastructure.    

How long have we got to phase these out?  

Scientists have been saying for decades we must restrict global warming to 1.5 degrees to provide a safety margin that protects us from the risk of tipping points that would put the planet on a hot house trajectory with catastrophic warming of six degrees or more. Earlier estimates gave us twenty or thirty years to achieve this. But scientists now reveal these estimates were optimistic and that 1.5 degree warming is already locked in – even if we cut emissions to zero immediately and that we need to achieve a reduction of 125% by 2030.  

We are now told we need to reduce emissions to zero by 2035 to avoid a 2 degree warming. Two degrees warming reduces our chances of stabilising our climate and avoiding catastrophic warming, but TfM believes on the basis of earlier forecasts and the prospect of delays caused by business as usual inertia this figure will be revised downward in coming years so we should not use it as a target – we need to reduce emissions as quickly as we can and aim for zero by 2030, with an interim target of 50% reduction by 2025.  

This means removal of all motorised transport, machinery and equipment within eight and a half years.   

Politicians and others might like to argue this is unrealistic, but the reality is the planet is not open to discussion on this matter, and responding will challenge our values, aspirations/expectations and choices we must make. This was reflected in my closing address at our last forum, The Future We Must Plan for, but I have added a quotation from Prof Carl Saga’s famous “Blue Dot Speech below, delivered at Cornell University in 1994.  

The Earth is a very small stage in a vast cosmic arena……Our posturings, our imagined self-importance, the delusion that we have some privileged position in the universe, are challenged by this point of pale light. Our planet is a lonely speck in the great enveloping cosmic dark. In our obscurity – in all this vastness – there is no hint that help will come from elsewhere to save us from ourselves. 

The Earth is the only world known, so far, to harbor life. There is nowhere else, at least in the near future, to which our species could migrate. Visit, yes. Settle, not yet. Like it or not, for the moment, the Earth is where we make our stand. It has been said that astronomy is a humbling and character-building experience. There is perhaps no better demonstration of the folly of human conceits than this distant image of our tiny world. To me, it underscores our responsibility to deal more kindly with one another and to preserve and cherish the pale blue dot, the only home we’ve ever known.

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Zero emissions – The looming challenge

It is just possible the magnitude, scale and complexity of the challenge might be dawning on some of some of our politicians. Whilst most continue to believe it can be addressed by simply bolting a greenhouse emission program dominated by technological fixes onto business as usual, some may appreciate this will require nothing short of transformational change and that Australians will be one of the most critically affected. Whether our politicians are up to it is another matter.  Our current crop clearly are not. Most need to be replaced/voted out by people that treat the situation seriously, as a genuine emergency with a comprehensive plan.  

This applies to all tiers of government, but it also requires institutional repair and reform within all government departments and other agencies that must provide expert advice without fear or favour – something which has been lost over recent decades but will become critically important in managing the transformational change required in coming years.  

As noted in our latest forum, progress in responding to our environmental challenges (of which climate change is a major part) has been dogged for decades by vested interests intent on maintaining business as usual by downgrading the need for action, often attempting to discredit or call into question the science and making it a political issue, or using greenwash to rebadge business as usual. This situation continues today. The cost of poor governance has become obvious during the last year. The failure of Victoria’s hotel quarantine system and degraded capacity of government departments to respond which resulted in hundreds of deaths is an obvious example but is only one of many that demonstrate the urgent need for reform within all levels of government.  

As noted in our last forum there are many things that can and must be done immediately to respond to our environmental challenge but the major barrier has always been the politics. That has to change but this will require sustained public pressure to make it happen.

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The Premier’s One Belt One Road “Deal” Dead and Buried

Serious concerns were raised about this “deal” in an earlier blog last year. Some of these related to matters of national sovereignty and it is not surprising the federal government has vetoed it. But It also raises fundamental issues of governance which has concerned TfM for some time. It is our view that sound governance and proper process is critical if we are to achieve better outcomes: not just in “transport” but all aspects of government policy with profound impact on our daily lives.  

What is particularly concerning is this “deal” according to The Age Friday 23 April was a closely guarded affair done by the Premier in his own office with his then secretary Chris Eccles. According to The Age, senior officials who had trade expertise with links to China were never called and the matter was never approved by Andrew’s cabinet. Further “had he consulted with his federal Labor colleagues they might have told him …. it was its policy not to sign up to the program”.    

We believe similar behaviour has been repeated more generally in the state government’s transport infrastructure program. This has also been the subject of earlier blogs, and a forum was run on it (governance) in 2017, but the situation does not appear to have improved since. All governments need checks and balances to keep them honest. It seems the need for transparency and public scrutiny of government at all levels has become increasingly critical. 

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