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best practice freeways governance government policy megaprojects

Lack of a Transport Plan Slammed by the VAGO

Transport for Melbourne (TfM) and other well qualified transport forums have been constantly reminding the State government of the need for a transport plan. This is mandated under the Transport Integration Act (TIA), so we are relieved that at long last the Victorian Government Audit Office has finally taken the government to task.

However this has fallen on deaf ears and the government continues to insist it has a plan. TfM would respectfully point out that a series of schemes that were developed independently does not constitute a plan. If the government has a plan it needs to tell us what it is, but it is important the government be reminded what constitutes a plan in the context of the TIA. Ultimately it is the quality and relevance of the plan that matters and that is a governance issue.

Quoting from the Transport Integration Act

The transport plan must—

(a)  set the planning framework within which transport bodies are to operate;

(b)  set out the strategic policy context for transport;

(c)  include medium to long term strategic directions, priorities and actions;

(d)  be prepared having regard to the vision statement, transport system objectives and decision making principles;

(e) be prepared having regard to national transport and infrastructure priorities;

(f) demonstrate an integrated approach to transport and land use planning;

(g) identify the challenges that the transport plan seeks to address;

(h) include a short term action plan that is regularly updated.

Almost all of the above are ignored by the current government. The government’s plan comprises an ad-hoc bunch of mega infrastructure projects including the Big Build program and others and a handful of strategies developed by the Department of Transport for different elements of the transport portfolio some of which are poorly developed. There is no vision to guide the plan, or strategic policy context apart from using it to create jobs and win government at the next election, and no attempt to identify the challenges facing us in the future. Government planning remains based largely on the continuation of business as usual.

It was clear from our last TfM forum, The Future We Must Plan For, it will not be business as usual. Covid has demonstrated the vulnerability of our economy and how quickly it can be disrupted. This event is only one of many that is likely to impact our economy and our way of life in the future. The latest IPCC report should be a stark reminder that the future we must plan for is changing rapidly. It will be dominated by environmental change and become a very different world to the one we live in today. This must be reflected in transport planning. The State government’s Big Build program does not anticipate any of this and as a consequence will ultimately result in stranded assets that have no value in the future and a burden of debt.

The absence of a properly constituted plan prescribed by the TIA is a concern but of even greater concern is the lack of checks and balances and proper process by which it has been progressed.

A transport plan must be developed and implemented in a way that is transparent, and follow processes which ensure its integrity and accountability. This requires a framework for assessing and ranking programs and projects in terms of their contribution to the “vision”.

It is critical that priority is given to actions that deliver the greatest return. Such actions are not confined to formal programs or projects. They may include policy and regulatory change, changes in works practices which can result in improvements in operational efficiency and improved customer service that generate better outcomes.

Achieving these goals may require recruitment and training supported by appropriate organisational structures to ensure government is provided with high quality advice and skills to develop and implement policy and ensure proper process is carried out, conducted in an environment which encourages communication of frank and fearless advice to government based on best practice. There is plenty of scope for improvement in this area; it would be a good place to start and that should be part of the plan.

These actions can provide the basis for the development of formal programs and projects funded from working expenses or capital budgets but again the priority must be given to those which generate the highest return on investment.

TfM has long held the view that governments should focus first on the existing “system” and its supporting infrastructure and make it as good as possible before building new. There is no shortage of transport infrastructure, but much of it is poorly maintained, in need of renewal and not used efficiently. This is a critical issue but needs to be addressed as part of the plan and funded accordingly.

Maintenance is usually funded from recurrent budgets instead of capital. It also tends to be tightly constrained so there is pressure to do more with less and focus on measurable outcomes. Investment in this area is therefore likely to be well targeted, yield high rates of return on investment as well as being subjected to a high level of scrutiny and accountability.

Benefits from capital works projects are more difficult to assess and have the potential to be subject to political influence or used for political purposes. Benefits also take longer to be realised, sometimes many years, often long after the minister or government responsible for the project has moved on. This makes it more difficult to audit and hold those responsible to account. As a general rule returns on capital investment vary inversely with the size and cost of the project and mega infrastructure projects have a particularly poor record. The Westgate Tunnel project is a good example but there are plenty more in the government’s Big Build pipeline.

Despite these problems capital works projects continue to dominate transport planning today in terms of publicity and budget allocations, and for many, particularly politicians, perceived to be the essence of a transport plan today.

It is argued that investment in capital infrastructure can be a lazy way to address transport problems. It promotes a mindset that says problems can be solved simply by throwing money at it without the need to understand the business itself and how it can be improved. This mindset is often reinforced by the belief that the bigger and more expensive the project the better the outcome. Under this scenario it is little wonder transport outcomes in this State have been so poor for so many years. This will continue so long as governments prioritise the least efficient and least effective measures to improve our transport system ie capital investment, particularly in major infrastructure projects whilst ignoring or underfunding far more effective mechanisms outlined above.

VAGO is absolutely right to criticise the State government for not having a transport plan. However TfM’s greatest concern is the quality and relevance of the plan and the political environment in which it is created. It is also important that transport planning not exist in a vacuum and must reflect broader environmental obligations including global emission reduction targets which must also be achieved for the transport system as a whole. This must be included in the transport plan and given top priority. All of this requires political leadership, courage, good governance and the environment required to create it. Achieving this will require fundamental changes of a systemic nature – without this we cannot expect better transport outcomes.

The importance of good governance has been highlighted by the covid pandemic. Governments at both State and Federal levels have been forced to listen to medical experts and appropriate institutional structures have existed for them to provide advice. For the most part this advice has been accepted but there have been occasions when politicians have ignored it thinking they knew better, and we have seen the consequences measured in loss of life.

Unfortunately political respect for independent expert advice does not always extend to government departments, which have often become politicised. Too often government ministers and their too commonly unqualified advisors think they know best and poorly treat those who should be providing them with expert advice. This is reflected in poor outcomes, not just in transport but all government portfolios. Addressing this will become increasingly critical if we are to have any success in responding to the challenges that lie ahead, particularly those driven by climate and environmental change.

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best practice freeways governance government policy megaprojects

WestGate Tunnel Project Another “Big Build” Disaster

This project was always a disaster waiting to happen. It is a terrible project and should never have been contemplated let alone built in the first place. It was not part of any transport plan, although to be fair the State government does not have a plan. It is just a project bowled up to the State government by Transurban, an unsolicited bid designed to strengthened its position as a toll road operator, which the government bought because it helped its image of getting on with the job and would create jobs in the construction industry. The case against it is included in the papers section on this web site and have referred to it in an earlier blog.

Lack of feasibility studies and planning was always problematic and has doomed this project. Like all mega infrastructure projects promoted by the State government today, they are rushed to suit political objectives and tenders are called before the design work is carried out. It is a bit like quoting to build a house when you have no idea what the building will look like or the ground conditions on which it will be built. The risk is huge and must be built into the tender price. Everyone knew or should have known that the ground through which the tunnel was to be bored would be heavily contaminated but this was never properly tested so it is no surprise this has become a serious issue and stalled the project at enormous cost.

Quoting Timna Jacks and Patric Hatch “The Age has confirmed with sources close to the project that the joint building venture, CPB Contractors and John Holland, is claiming the project has blown out by as much as $5.2 billion. The dispute centres on the handling of about 3 million tonnes of soil, with an unknown portion of it believed to be contaminated with perand polyfluoroalkyl chemicals – the potential carcinogens known as PFAS”. “PFAS” is so toxic there is no safe way to dispose it but the State government is trying to have it reclassified as a less toxic chemical and has been struggling to find a site where it can be safely stored.

So who is going to pay for this costly mess? The premier has rightly argued that this was not the government’s project “ Transurban came to the government with this project, they chose the builder so they need to sort it out with the builder”. But will it end up like the East West Link where the government ended up paying more than $1billion to cancel the contract after declaring that it could be cancelled at little or no cost?

Whatever the outcome we the broader community will be the losers. Apart from the waste of public funds on a project we don’t need, the opportunity cost of not investing in projects and programs of real need is huge. But perhaps the greatest cost will be ongoing failure of governance, absence of proper process, lack of integrity and breach of public trust. These issues have been nomalised under this government and we will continue to pay a huge price if they are not addressed.

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best practice freight governance

Are We Seeing the Death of V/Line Freight?

Whilst the glory days of Victorian rail freight are well and truly behind us, there has long been a view that rail freight is the most energy efficient way of transporting freight, particularly long haul and bulk commodities such as grain and much of the container traffic around Victoria and interstate. Despite its numerous challenges rail freight has far greater potential to meet its zero emission obligations than road freight vehicles and should therefore be the favoured freight mode for the future.

The recent decision by the State government to allow “A Doubles” as well as “B Doubles” use of Victoria road network comes as a shock. The trucking industry has already taken most of the Vline’s freight business and this decision will enable it to capture much of what remains but increased numbers of very large road vehicles will come at significant social, economic as well as environmental cost.

Heavy trucks account for most of the damage to our road system and this is becoming a major issue in many regional areas. Studies by the BOT in Queensland estimate damage from a “B”double are 23,000 times that of a private motor car. Road damage impacts other road services such as buses which reduces their ability to maintain service schedules and connections with other services and is well documented. It also causes vehicle damage and increased maintenance and servicing costs, as well as increased risk of road crashes and road trauma. Large road vehicles also generate significant noise and air pollution, the costs of which can take years to manifest themselves, but can be severe, particularly in built up areas. According to Australian Rail Track Corporation

  • the accident cost associated with road freight transport is ten times that for rail freight transport on a per tonne kilometre basis

  • the cost to the Australian economy of heavy vehicle accidents has been estimated at up to $3 billion every year.

But the trucking industry has other problems. Heavy truck drivers often have long shifts and are under severe pressure to meet deadlines and make as many trips as possible. Additional pressure can apply to owner drivers to pay financial and operating expenses associated with their vehicle. This creates an environment which encourages drivers to bend or break the rules and drive when they are fatigued. Use of stimulants etc to keep them awake whilst driving is well known. It has been estimated that 10% of drivers are on drugs or stimulants. The crash on the Eastern Freeway last year in which police men and women were killed highlights these concerns. These issues are well understood and is one of the reasons why the work force in this industry is aging and not being replaced by younger people.

It is easy to view the introduction of “A” Doubles as an isolated case of policy failure but is only one many which are systematically undermining the rail freight industry and if not addressed quickly will result its demise in Victoria. It reflects a lack of understanding of the strategic importance of rail freight in the freight industry and what is required to run it as a business in a competitive environment. Given these concerns, this decision by the State Government is extraordinary and must be challenged.

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best practice governance public transport zero emissions

Zero Emissions – What is the Plan for Melbourne’s transport?

Introduction

The Prime Minister recently stated that achieving zero emissions would be similar to tackling Covid – just a case of applying technological solutions and leave business to carry it out, whilst in the meantime proceeding with business as usual. A more accurate assessment of the challenge was made by Prof Johan Rockstrom, that it will require an effort equivalent to the Apollo program to achieve success. I.e., a large-scale concerted effort, hugely complex involving science, politics, the public sector and industry employing resilience and creativity with a common goal. With climate, he argues there is little time left. We have ten years to transition the whole world to a new logic. But it needs a plan and it will need to be far better than the one delivered so far for covid.

Understanding and defining the problem is the starting point for this zero-emission project, but is only the first of many elements that would need to be addressed in a zero-emission plan discussed briefly in these notes.

Elements of a zero-emission transport plan for Melbourne

Essential elements of a zero-emission transport plan for Melbourne suggested below would be reflected in any serious program/project and include the following:

1. Terms of reference – know what you are planning for – scope, outcomes/outputs that are clearly defined and can be measured

2. A deadline for achieving it

3. Implications for not meeting the deadline – usually measured as a cost with penalties in financial terms

4. Steps/milestones that must be achieved, their sequence/order in which they must be completed supported by plans/programs etc to make it happen

5. Allocation of resources

6. An assessment of risks and barriers that must be overcome and strategies and priorities to address them

7. Contingency plans to address unforeseen circumstances that threaten the plan

8. Assignment of people/agencies responsible for implementing the plan, its structure and accountabilities

9. Assignment of auditors and others to monitor progress, measure and record outcomes and hold the program managers to account.

At this stage none of these fundamental elements exist for achieving net zero emissions. Actions to reduce emissions must start immediately – achieving early reductions is just as critical as meeting the 2030 zero emission target but there are no plans for either at this stage. At best we have a vague commitment by the State government and an adhoc list of actions that address part of the problem but we don’t even know the full extent of what we must plan for. I.e., the “project” has not been properly defined yet, so that must be the starting point. It also requires a definition of the end point and recognises that over the course of “project” many of the assumptions made will change as different sectors respond to actions implemented by the “project” and the changing world around it. In other words, it is a dynamic concept that should be more accurately defined as a “framework” which must anticipate changes during the implementation stage and have the flexibility to adapt as they arise without compromising end goals.

1. What is the scope of the plan and what are we planning for?

For the purposes of Melbourne’s transport this means achieving zero emissions generated, directly or indirectly by the transport system as a whole. This includes all modes of transport, supporting infrastructure and emissions from imbedded energy, use, maintenance, renewal and disposal of all components at the end of their economic life.

Whilst the primary goal must be to achieve zero emissions by the end of the program, it is critical emissions are reduced as quickly as possible before the deadline. Some of this will occur directly or indirectly as a result of pressure to reduce emissions over the course of the program/project with implications for the transport task itself, service planning and the need for supporting infrastructure. Whilst many of these trends will be difficult to pick some are becoming obvious and must be taken into account.

The airline industry is a good example. It is already struggling because of the covid pandemic but will be put under more pressure as emission-based taxes such as those proposed by the European Union become more widely imposed. Legal actions such as the case against Royal Dutch Shell by the Netherlands government which directs Shell to reduce its emissions by 50% by 2030 will also impact before long and it is likely more will follow. This ruling applies to all of Shell’s global operations and downstream uses of its oil and gas including all activities that use these raw materials such as the plastics industry etc. This is expected to have flow on effects which will put even more pressure on airlines and other parts of the transport sector.

But these are only short term problems. Achieving zero emissions will be much more challenging. Zero emissions are not confined to the fuel that powers the aircraft but to every aspect of its operations, including the imbedded energy in the planes themselves, their maintenance and infrastructure that supports it. This is an enormous challenge and may make it impossible to survive. If it fails the impact on the local Melbourne economy will be profound. It would remove any justification for a new train line to the airport and the impact on economic activity and transport task associated with it would have flow on effects throughout Melbourne.

Converting the existing road and rail fleet to zero emissions also presents huge challenges and it is not clear how this will be achieved. Even if there are solutions, it is not clear how quickly they could be carried out. Almost certainly there will be factors which limit the take up. These may be technological, supply (of critical materials such as rare earths etc), production (electronic chips etc), affordability or financial constraints within the economy. All may be problematic, even critical in achieving a 2030 deadline. Similar concerns apply to supporting infrastructure on the roads, rail lines and other sources such as stand-alone power from the grid etc.

It has been assumed by many that a transition to electric vehicles will be a major part of the solution to achieving zero emissions, however this is by no means assured. The environmental footprint of an electric powered car, including the imbedded energy to create it in the first place, its use and disposal at the end of its economic life is no better than a conventional motor vehicle. Considerable improvements will be necessary to improve the efficiency of batteries, power sources to charge them and the ability to recycle all components (particularly batteries) at the end of the vehicle’s life. This will require integration with a new “circular economy” – an economy that does not exist at this time.

It is difficult to consider this program in isolation. It will create changes with flow on effects to the broader economy which will rebound to transport. Service/maintenance and other industries that support transport is a good example. Battery driven vehicles require far less servicing and

maintenance than conventional vehicles with significant implications for jobs in an industry that is a major part of the local economy. There will be many other businesses that also fail in an increasingly difficult environment with similar flow on effects that will ultimately impact the demand for transport, the way the services are provided, infrastructure that is required to support it and emissions generated.

Similar concerns apply to the food industry. Climate change presents serious challenges for the food sector that supplies Melbourne. A declining and ultimately zero emission environment will put additional pressure on all sectors of the food industry to grow, harvest, process and distribute it. Each sector will have its own zero emission targets and it is not clear how these will be achieved. For example, how will tractors, other farm machinery, manufacturing plant and transport, all of which is predominately diesel powered be replaced with zero emission power plants? What restrictions will be imposed on petroleum based fertilisers and herbicides?

These are some examples of changes that may be expected in coming years approaching a zero emissions economy. The overall impact would be profound and trigger a major transformation in the local economy and with it a fundamental change in the transport task and the way in which it will be met. It is important these changes be anticipated, planned for and ultimately reflected in transport planning and its own plan to achieve zero emission.

2. What is the deadline?

This should be obvious and well understood but there is little agreement. The federal government is reluctant to commit to any deadline and whilst state and local governments have made some commitments, these vary, there are no properly developed plans to implement them, and none are consistent with latest deadlines imposed by the science. This was clearly articulated at TfM’s annual forum in December 2020 by Prof David Karoly i.e., that to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees above pre-industrial levels – which the G7 group of nations recently committed to, greenhouse emissions must be reduced by 125% by 2030. This means abandoning earlier targets of 2050, 2040. The Climate Council has since advised that limiting global warming to 2 degrees would require zero emissions by 2035 i.e., only five years later. But 2 degrees will put us very close to a tipping point that would result in runaway climate change so it is argued that 2030 should be the latest target date for zero emissions.

3. Implications for not meeting the deadline – usually measured as a cost with penalties in financial terms

Failure to achieve this target i.e., 2030 increases the risk of runaway climate change with increased global warming of up to six degrees Celsius or more that would lead to the extinction of most of the biosphere including humanity. Such a prospect is unthinkable so meeting this target must be seen as non-negotiable and achieved at any price.

4. Steps/milestones that must be achieved, their sequence/order in which they must be completed, and intermediate emission reduction targets

It is not clear how existing modes of transport can achieve zero emission targets by working forward. Such an approach is more likely to promote planning based on business as projections. The most appropriate basis for the development of milestone targets in an emergency situation is to work backwards i.e., back-casting from a zero-emission world of 2030 i.e., a non-negotiable end point and use it as a baseline for setting intermediate goals, which must include interim emission reduction targets and steps required to achieve them. This will require modelling to provide a rational basis for

determining the transport task and how it will be delivered. This will force politicians to confront very difficult scenarios and make tough decisions which have been ignored in the past or put in the too hard basket.

At this stage the only modes that meet zero emissions are active transport i.e., walking and cycling. The most confronting priority relates to the supply of food and essential services – currently provided by petrol and diesel vehicles. This presents a huge challenge and must be a top priority.

Most of emission reductions achieved during the early stages of the “project” will have to be achieved using the existing fleet, ie before it is phased out. This will require a combination of behavioural change involving improved efficiency, transfer to more efficient modes and reduced usage i.e., by transporting goods and services and traveling less often and over less distances, using traditional approaches of best practice. This program will be very short and require the development of external measures such as increased renewable power from the grid and advances in technology etc to make it happen.

5. Allocation of resources and priorities

This is of fundamental importance – without it there can be no commitment, and must be reflected in State government budgets and funding priorities. It must also be reflected in all existing policies, works and services and capital works programs to ensure all of these are contributing to the same goals. Any projects that do not comply, and there are many, particularly in the State Government’s Big Build program, must be axed. Similar priorities must apply at the local government level and measures taken to ensure this happens. This raises many issues of a governance nature which are discussed in an earlier paper “Melbourne’s Transport -The Need for a New Framework for Assessing Priorities”

6. An assessment of risks and barriers that must be overcome and strategies and priorities to address them.

Most of the barriers will be of a political nature. This will require development of strategies to manage the change process. Many of the “levers” that can be applied for this purpose are outlined in a paper by Donella Meadows “Places to intervene in a system”. Briefly this includes, in increasing order of effectiveness:

  • numbers (subsidies, taxes, standards)

  • material stocks and flows

  • regulating negative feedback loops

  • driving positive feedback loops

  • information flows

  • the rules of the system (incentives, punishments and constraints)

  • the power of self-organisation

  • the goals of the system

  • the mindset or paradigm out of which the goals, rules feedback structure arise.

This systems-based approach is applicable to complex systems such as a national or local economy. It highlights the scale and complexity of the task. Successful application will almost certainly require the use of all levers identified above, but the starting point is the mindset, which must change at all levels and without this there will be no prospect of success.

7. Contingency plans to address unforeseen circumstances that threaten the plan.

The environmental imperative must demand contingency plans to ensure zero emission targets are met. It is difficult to specify what these might be but may arise at every level. At a macro level they may be economic due to international market failure, conflict, the loss of key export markets (such as iron ore to China), trade barriers, failures to deal with covid or other diseases, environmental disasters – the list is endless, but there must be plans to counter them.

8. Who will be responsible for implementing the plan, its structure and accountabilities?

This is a critical issue that must be addressed at the outset. It will require amongst other things people and organisations with the skills, knowledge, expertise etc to manage the program and the independence and organisation structures to carry it out free from political and other influences that may compromise the outcome.

9. Who will monitor progress, measure and record outcomes and hold the program to account?

Similar argument applies to the monitoring process etc.

In summary, the ability to achieve a zero-emission transport sector will depend on the thoroughness of the planning process the way in which it is implemented. The scale and complexity is huge, and will require coordination of many other programs driven by similar zero emission reduction and other environment targets which must be run in parallel. Even at this stage, without extensive modelling it is clear that achieving this will require a total transformation of our society, its values, aspirations, expectations, the choices we make and the way we live.

These notes only scratch the surface but they may help start the conversation about the need for a plan. It is becoming increasingly apparent that a growing number of business in the commercial sector are already advanced in their thinking and planning for a zero-emission world but often driven from a narrow corporate perspective. Whilst some will present opportunities to progress better zero emission outcomes as a whole, it is critical these interests are understood and not become opportunities to hijack the program to suit vested interests.

Thinking behind the conceptual framework proposed above has been in response to the “climate emergency”. Missing the targets by five years would commit this planet to 2 degree warming. Missing it by ten years would almost certainly put it in a situation where cascading tipping points occur which would put it on a runaway hothouse earth trajectory and global temperature rises that could exceed six degrees by the end of the century. At this stage we are starting to see the impact of a 1.1 degree warming – extreme heat conditions in Australia during last summer followed by firestorms on an unprecedented scale followed by severe flooding and storm damage, which has been repeated this year in the northern hemisphere with even more extreme temperatures up to 56C degrees C (or 133 degrees F) and torrential rain and flooding in Germany/Belgium and Japan on an unprecedented scale – less than a year later. It is a pattern that can be expected to be repeated with increasing severity with only a 1.1 degree warming. But this is only one of many indicators that highlight the challenges we face in the future.

It could be argued that the prospects of meeting a 2030 deadline with such a program are unrealistic and a waste of time. If that is the case one could argue why bother and simply continue to party and carry on with business as usual and go to hell in a hand basket. A more appropriate response might be to treat this in a similar way to the Japanese threat in the last world war – treat it as if our lives depended on it and do what it takes to survive. In the case of the WW2 the Australian response was immediate but the threat was also far less. The very worst outcome was to lose the war and be

invaded and subjugated by the Japanese – not a great prospect but at least we would survive. The climate trajectory we are facing is one that leads to extinction – a point of no return. Survival will need a plan – not a simple one like the Prime Minister proposed but one of enormous complexity and scale as Prof Rockstrom wrote a couple of years ago from his institute in Potsdam with a reminder we have little time left to develop and implement it.

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best practice car park governance public transport

Federally Funded Railway Commuter Car Parks – Another example of political pork barrelling

The Federal Opposition has rightly accused the Federal government of using the $389 million car parking program as a political rort and is another example of abuse of governance and proper process which we have raised on a number of occasions. But it also raises fundamental issues including the need for a transport framework/strategic plan and an independent process for evaluation and ranking investment programs which is essential to ensure precious funds are spent in areas of greatest need and strategic objectives are met in the most cost-effective manner.

Station car parking does have a legitimate place in a Victorian transport plan for a modal interchange strategy which promotes greater access to the public transport network, but it is a very costly way of doing this and in some situations is totally inappropriate. This is particularly relevant at inner city stations which can be accessed by tram, bus, taxi or where many people simply walk or cycle to the station. Promoting and improving these access modes requires minimal investment in supporting infrastructure and should be top priority. These are locations where the cost of land is relatively high and its use for commuter car parking cannot be justified. In these situations provision of more commuter car parking would simply generate more car traffic but would also encourage people to drive further from outer areas to enable them to travel in a cheaper fare zone.

Middle – Inner city stations such as Glenferrie, and Camberwell Stations are examples where commuter car parking should not be provided in the first place and limited to drop off and pick-ups (“kiss and ride”) but these have been included in the federal government’s car parking program. The Camberwell commuter car park is of particular concern because it is used extensively (inappropriately) by local traders and shoppers and is accessed from Burke Road, a tram route that is already heavily congested. To encourage more road traffic for commuter purposes would simply add to the congestion and its detrimental impact on tram services, particularly in morning and evening peak travel times.

Construction of a commuter car park at Glenferrie adjacent to another tram route on Glenferrie Road would never be recommended for similar reasons, but the cost at this location would be prohibitive. The land would have to be acquired and a multideck car park built. The total cost would be very high for zero net benefit and planning and development issues for such a development would be hugely problematic and politically fraught at the local level. It is amazing none of these issues were taken into account.

None of the above is rocket science and should have been reflected in the federal government car parking program. If priorities had been established independently of

government by state government departments responsible for public transport this rorting should never have happened. But this raises more fundamental issues about the relevance of the motor vehicle in a zero emission world and its impact on travel and transport and the infrastructure required to support it in the future. That is a subject which all governments at all levels need to start responding to as a matter of urgency.

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best practice governance government policy

Activating Public Planning

https://www.e-elgar.com/shop/gbp/being-a-planner-in-society-9781788973786.html


Having written Being a Planner in Society and its Companion Website I ask myself, ‘what do I want planning to be’? I have an answer, but it is a question for all readers of the book. If I were still teaching urban and environmental planning, I would put that question to my students. More important than my answer is the debates which I believe should today take place around that kind of questioning. I’m hoping the theoretical exploration in my book may throw some light on the matter.

My answer is that I want planning to become a social movement again, to find again its transformative origins, to invent new ways of designing our human response to the environment for the better, and to re-join social with environmental transformation. All this is in light of the experience of planning in theory and practice that we have gained over the last hundred or so years.

However, to do that, to reinstate planning, that is public planning by the democratic state, we need to understand what has gone wrong with the so-called neoliberal model of governance. As I explain in my book, and further illustrated in the companion website, the balance of power over the detailed making and implementation of policy has been transferred from a competent, professional public service, with clear lines of accountability, depth of expertise and longstanding experience, to a political tier with an intense but shallow focus on the political cycle.

 In Australia the unbalanced empowerment of political control has led to a diffusion of accountability in which ‘cabinets’ consisting of most of the senior politicians are put collectively in charge of almost everything important. The drive for privatization has diminished the permanent public service and outsourced many functions which properly belong within government to private firms with no public accountability under contracts, sub-contracts and complex but ineffective regulation.

This process has been going on now at federal and state levels for at least thirty years. Senior economists, political scientists and journalists have complained about it. Thus Laura Tingle in 2015, then political editor of the Australian Financial Review, wrote that ‘we have forgotten how to govern’. John Hewson (economist and former leader of the Liberal Party) writes, ‘The public service has been effectively denuded of essential talent by years of spending cuts and efficiency dividends – many departments are now referred to as gutted shells’. Even the former Labour Treasurer and Prime Minister, Paul Keating, who initially embraced neo-liberalisation on behalf of the Labour Party declared in 2017 that ‘liberal economics has run into a dead end and has had no answer to the contemporary malaise’.

Many people in leadership positions now know that neo-liberalisation has produced a failed system of governance. And it is a governance model created by ideology not an economic model. But because of the path dependence of both institutions and ideas in Australia, nothing is being done to change it. Its failure was on show in July 2020 as the State of Victoria suffered a huge (by Australian standards) second wave of coronavirus.

Through concerted and swift police action to ‘lock down’ the whole country, Australia had been initially successful in containing the spread of the virus, closing all opportunities for people to gather or even leave their homes, with few exceptions. Returning travellers from overseas were forced to isolate in designated hotels for fourteen days. So successful was this ‘suppression’ strategy that when caseloads went right down, governments started to ease the restrictions to get back to something like normality.

However in late June 2020 an outbreak of infections occurred in quarantine hotels in Melbourne. Guards contracted the virus from the confined travellers and, because restrictions on movement and gathering were by then relaxed, the infected guards went home to their families and friends, who became infected in turn. The virus then spread rapidly throughout Melbourne suburbs. The result was a second wave of coronavirus in Australia (with up to 400 cases and three or four deaths per day), centred in Melbourne, much greater than the first wave.

The piecemeal response of the government of Victoria was first to lock down certain postcodes and high-rise public housing blocks where the virus appeared. When that didn’t work to contain the spread, whole municipalities were ordered into lock down, then the whole of metropolitan Melbourne. Now (mid-July) cases are increasing outside the metropolitan region.

It’s easy to blame the Premier of Victoria for this outbreak. But, in an emergency, politicians operate within the established governance model. In keeping with the neoliberal model of outsourcing, contracts were given to private security companies to provide hotel guards. In some cases it appears that these companies further subcontracted the tasks, ending up with virtually untrained and unprotected casual workers in close contact with infected returned travellers.

Casual work has grown from about 13 per cent of the workforce in the 1980s to around 25 per cent in 2020. Casual workers, assumed to be self-employed, now form a permanent, highly exploited, tier of the labour force without the rights accorded to employees. They include aged care workers, Uber drivers, hospital and school cleaners, bar tenders, security guards, abattoir workers and even university staff (averaging 40 per cent of staff). Many have several jobs on the go.

Outsourcing plus casualization of labour is the underlying cause of the outbreak. A government without depth of policy capacity and clear lines of accountability in the public service has proved unable to manage the pandemic, adopting the stop-start approach of suppression rather than elimination, which is both feasible and in the long run less economically damaging. The government has refused to acknowledge the systemic failure, tossing the issue to a public inquiry that will not report until September.

The Covid19 event is an existential crisis. Governments around the world had been warned that a devastating pandemic was likely to occur, just as they have been warned that global heating will have catastrophic consequences. But the absence of public planning for people, planet and places has left citizens at risk of death and disability, and economies in danger of destruction.

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How Neoliberalism Mutated into Crony Capitalism

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Let’s be clear. Whatever system of economic governance dominates the world today, it is not pure neoliberalism. It is better described as crony capitalism, which is opposed to the agenda of those like Friedrich Hayek who started the neoliberal ball rolling. Neoliberalism has mutated into crony capitalism with devastating results for economic growth and social justice, endangering the health and welfare of entire societies.

Crony capitalism has been around in some form or another since the beginning of capitalism itself. I can’t do better than cite the definition in Wikipedia: ‘an economic system in which businesses thrive not as a result of risk, but rather as a return on money amassed through a nexus between a business class and the political class’.

The evidence of crony capitalism is abundant over the globe, from Trump’s America to Xi Jinping’s China and Bolsonaro’s Brazil. In Australia its resurgence is recorded in a book called Game of Mates, How Favours Bleed the Nation by economists Cameron Murray and Paul Frijters, in Dead Right: How neoliberalism ate itself and what comes next (‘Quarterly Essay’ by Richard Denniss), and in On Fairness by Sally McManus. I provide a few examples in Being a Planner in Society.

Hayek in his book Law, Legislation and Liberty conceived of an economic governance system in which ‘law precedes legislation’. ‘Law’, governing the behaviour of the market economy, would be determined by a legislative assembly consisting of wise elders (over 45 years old) serving electoral terms of fifteen years. Their election would not be subject to universal suffrage, and anyone receiving any benefits from the state (pensions, unemployment benefits, government salaries) would be automatically excluded from voting. Hayek’s plan was to set up a governing authority beyond political control to prevent elected politicians interfering with the market.

This position was later reinforced by the work of Milton Friedman, and the public choice theorists. As I observe in my book, politics, so it is argued by the public choice theorists, is nothing more than a game in which political actors (inside and outside government) maximise their short term advantage through ‘log-rolling’ bargains’. That cynical view became self-fulfilling.

The problem for the neoliberals is that electoral politics refused to go away, for the simple reason that people value universal suffrage that holds governments to account. The political class therefore continued to hold power even while they paid lip service to neoliberalism. The political class, even in manipulated democracies like Russia today, enjoy their power and legitimacy and work hard to maintain it. So the governance system we have today is a hybrid between corporate economic power supported by antidemocratic neoliberal ideology and political power supported by universal suffrage: that is crony capitalism. This result was what Hayek regarded as ‘the worst of both worlds’: political intervention with private corporate production.

Then came a theoretical spawn of neoliberalism called New Public Management. The ideology of NPM can be interpreted in different ways. It provided a salutary critique of sclerotic bureaucracies that had become distanced from the publics they served, hence ‘customer service’ became a byword for NPM but that admirable goal covered something more sinister. The scope and ambition of NPM is breathtaking;

New Public Management (NPM) is part of the managerial revolution that has gone around the world, affecting all countries, though to considerably different degrees. The theory of new public management contains insights from game theory and from the disciplines of law and economics. … The theoretical background of NPM is to be found in the strong criticism of a large public sector, to be found in the public choice school as well as Chicago School Economics, both attacking since the mid-1960s prevailing notions about public sector governance (Lane, 2000: 3).

There is not space here to undertake a critique of NPM (which is, incidentally, a major lacuna in my book). But the introduction by Lane makes clear the link with neoliberal ideology which I do address in the book. The essentials of NPM are these: the use of quasi-market structures for delivery of services, contracting out of government functions to private firms, setting performance targets and continual monitoring of performance, handing over power to senior management executives, replacing trained personnel in professions relevant to the government function (e.g. public health, environmental conservation, city planning, building regulation) with generalists trained in ‘management’. What this management training in fact amounts to is in-depth indoctrination in neoliberal ideology. Some of the Australian environment and planning failures to which I refer in the on-line Appendix can arguably be traced to the replacement of professionals in senior management by generalist managers. Of course the issue is far from simple, but this is a hypothesis that at least deserves to be thoroughly researched.

Hayek’s proposal to suspend universal suffrage, with society run by a largely unaccountable State, which is at the heart of neoliberal doctrine, was dangerous nonsense from the start. But its design to suspend the struggle for equality was adopted by Regan, Thatcher and a multitude of think tanks funded by corporate wealth. Neoliberalism quickly mutated into class warfare with suppression of the trades unions, vilification and abuse of the unemployed, massive cuts to the public service, and transfer of wealth from the poorest to the richest in society. The end result, as we now know, was not long term economic growth but miserly hoarding of wealth piled into tax havens and stock markets: the misereconomy. Crony capitalism is only one short step away from fascism, with populist politicians seizing the moment to limit democratic restraints in order to stay in power. We know where that ends.

The Canadian philosopher John Rawlston Saul saw what was happening twenty years ago. What he called ‘anti-government government’ created a ‘false populist model’. Think of Thatcher’s talk of ‘rolling back the state’, Trump’s talk of ‘draining the swamp’ and, even today’s ‘deep state’ conspiracy theories. Citing Mussolini’s rise to power, Saul remarks, ‘No matter how big and structured the Fascist Party became, it always declared itself to be the voice of anti-party, anti-government politics’.

The examples of crony capitalism in action today come thick and fast in that sector of the daily press that is not devoted to class warfare on behalf of corporate power. Commentators of the independent press in Australia are almost unanimous in ascribing the cause of the second surge in Covid 19 to the impoverishment of the casual workforce, lack of sick leave and poverty-level unemployment relief forcing workers to go on working when they are ill, the privatised system of aged care, and the lack of depth of government response. That is what has now caused 810 deaths and counting, in Victoria, destroyed the health of many survivors, and ruined the economy.

The crony-capitalist governance model as exhibited in Australia, has resulted in corruption of urban and regional planning in which deals are done between developers and governments to enrich the latter at the stroke of a pen. A huge area of Melbourne was converted from industrial to residential zoning without any provision for open space or educational and health services. Companies linked to the government of the day made millions from the increase in land value. Vast road building projects are signed off with private companies to enrich the latter at the expense of the public interest.

Failures of building regulation, outsourced to private firms, have resulted in hundreds of tower blocks being covered in flammable cladding. The weakly regulated private recycling industry has resulted in flammable material stored in huge warehouses, catching fire and belching toxic smoke over residential areas. After much of Beirut was destroyed by an explosion of ammonium nitrate, Australian journalists started nervously looking for stores of this chemical, and found a stockpile in Newcastle, New South Wales, four times the size of the stock in Beirut. Where? Just three kilometres from Newcastle’s CBD.

Hayek wanted to take power away from politicians. Crony capitalism shares power between the political class and the corporate sector. The Australian governance failures that have occurred since the 1990s have many sources: incompetence of a poorly organised and depleted public service, continued class warfare on working people and the unemployed, shameful environmental policy, mental cruelty to refugees, institutional paternalism, sexism and racism. No governance model is mono-causal and ‘pure’. But the current governance model has strayed far from liberalism, whether old or new.

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More on Governance

TfM has become increasingly concerned about the declining standards of governance at the political and institutional level within all levels of government. As noted in an earlier blog, poor governance is the main reason we have consistently achieved poor transport outcomes in Melbourne and Victoria generally but it is a complex issue with no simple solutions. Many of the problems have their roots in political thinking/dogma which can be very difficult to change. Three papers will be included in our blog over the next week by President Nick Low to provide a better understanding of this issue. These include: The Dysfunction of ‘New Public Management’, a lesson from Covid 19, How neoliberalism mutated into crony capitalism andActivating Public Planning. The first of these is included in this blog.


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The global experience of planning the response to the Covid 19 pandemic has revealed many failures of governance across the nations, both failures of political leadership and failures of the neo-liberal institutional models that govern policy making in the 21st Century.

The death of neo-liberal economics occurred in 2008 with the GFC. But its zombie-like ghost remained to haunt governance. The post-mortem has only just begun – most recently with the work of Kay and King (2020) – though the sickness was foreshadowed much earlier. The work of forensic examination of the corpse must continue to identify specifics of ‘organ failure’. In what follows I examine one such failure.

New Public Management

The particular neo-liberal organ of governance I examine is called ‘New Public Management’ (NPM). NPM is a theory of public sector management whose assumptions are built on the axioms of the Chicago school concerning human behaviour and its motivation. These axioms of ‘rationality’ are critically discussed at length by Kay and King (2020, e.g. p. 110 et seq. ‘The triumph of the American school’). The central axiom of the ‘American school’ is that individuals always seek to maximise their own ‘utility’. Further, the benign social outcome of utility-maximising individuals is only achieved through the free market. The precise connection between NPM and the Chicago School is too complex to address here. But it is important to note one observation of Kay and King which is relevant to what follows. The authors say, ‘Our brains are not built like computers but as adaptive mechanisms for making connections and recognising patterns. Good decisions often result from leaps of the imagination.’ (ibid: 47). With NPM there was a failure to imagine what is needed to protect the population of the State of Victoria, Australia, from the spread of the virus from returning travellers.

The central assumptions of NPM are as follows.

  • Professional experts in fields relevant to public policy are self-interested in promoting policies and understandings of the world that emerge from their professions. Professions are viewed as organised institutions promoting their own self-interest. Thus professional personnel are biased in favour of policy priorities that support their employment and remuneration. Fields of policy can thus become ‘captured’ by professional interests. (Somehow the economics profession has exempted itself from any implication of policy ‘capture’). Instead, people trained in ‘management’ replace professionals in senior executive positions in the public service. Their function is to ‘manage’ what political leaders decide, mostly meaning managing contracts with private sector agents.
  • There is scepticism about any value of ‘the public interest’ other than is demonstrated by market outcomes. Thus, the proposition that a profession might, at least in some important respects, represent the public interest in any particular field is discounted.

  • Only political leaders competing in electoral arenas are capable of devising policies in the public interest. Competition for votes becomes a kind of substitute for competition for customers. Policy making is thus seen as a top-down process, in which policies and their implementation are radically separated. In the words of Jan- Erik Lane (2000: 179), ‘In public policy, the policies government decides centrally are to be implemented either by means of central bureaux steering public employees at lower levels or through wide discretion on the part of policy networks’. Presumably the networks involve public and private sector actors.

These assumptions are simplistic and ideological. They have no basis in scientific observation of human behaviour. They justify the neoliberal programme of deregulation and reduction of the size of the public sector, in short, the hollowing out of the state. They support the desire of the economics profession to reduce economics to mathematical algorithms in order to make it look scientific and politically neutral.

The consequence for public sector management drawn from these assumptions is that the public sector should be structured with three elements: political leaders who decide policies, consultants (typically private sector) who advise political leaders, and managers who implement contracts to embody policies. In what follows I trace the unforeseen consequences of the NPM approach in the public health arena which resulted in a catastrophic failure of planning.

The outbreak of the Covid 19 virus in the State of Victoria, Australia, in 2020

After quite successfully containing the spread of the virus in a ‘first wave’ from March 2020, a second wave of infections hit the State of Victoria in July 2020. 768 people died from this second wave.1 The long term health of many more has been affected. The State was forced into ‘Stage 4’ lockdown which included a curfew between 8.00pm and 5.00am, enforced closure of many businesses, bans on movement beyond five kilometres from home, and compulsory wearing of face masks. The lockdown was enforced for more than three months.

It was established by genomic tracing that all of the second wave of infection originated from two quarantine hotels in which returning travellers were forcibly sequestrated. The virus was spread by hotel security guards who were insufficiently protected from the virus. Businesses suffered and the whole Australian economy was shocked. Political leaders such as Daniel Andrews (Premier of the State of Victoria) must of course accept ultimate responsibility for such a failure, as he has. He quickly announced a public inquiry into the outbreak. The head of the inquiry, Justice Jennifer Coate, reported in November 2020. No individual was found to be responsible. But the root cause lies deeper in the lack of effective planning conducted by Victoria’s public health administration.

In recent years planning for infection control from all sources began with the report by Dr Rosemary Lester published in 2014. Lester is a highly qualified expert in public health and epidemiology. Her report was delivered to the emergency management authority (Emergency Management Victoria). The epidemiological expertise shines through the report. Lester recommended the use of personal protective equipment and training in its use ‘in all health care settings’. Her report was shelved.

Under the name of the Minister for Health, a second planning report was published in March 2020 authored by senior public servants of the Victorian Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). These public servants had no public health or epidemiological background. Their report showed no awareness that the people looking after those quarantined in hotels needed to be equipped as health workers, with appropriate training and personal protective equipment. The report is a managerial document focusing mainly on the (then) three stages of governmental response. It draws heavily on a similarly managerial report from the Federal Department of Health.

In June 2020 an ‘operation’ was devised by DHHS named ‘Soteria’ (after the Greek goddess of rescue). This operation was designed to manage quarantine of returned overseas travellers. The DHHS displayed nothing on its website about the operation, about who devised it or what its aims were. At the public inquiry headed by Justice Coate a sheet ofinstructions to ‘hotel security staff’ emerged: ‘OPERATION SOTERIA, PPE Advice to Hotel Security Staff and AO’s (sic) in Contact with Quarantined Individuals’. It advised that personal protective equipment was not required to be worn by security staff at any point of contact. The latter include the hotel lobby, the quarantine floor, and at doorways to clients’ hotel rooms. Only hand hygiene and surgical masks were ‘recommended’. Hotel quarantine clients (guests) were recommended to wear surgical masks ‘if tolerated’.

It is obvious that this operation did not benefit from epidemiological advice. In evidence to the Coate Inquiry, Professor Lindsay Grayson (Director of the Austin Hospital’s infectious disease department) said that, as well as training in the proper use of masks, security guards at any point of contact with hotel guests should have been dressed in full personal protective equipment (PPE) to the same standard as health workers. It is also common sense. Epidemiological advice should not even have been needed. Everyone who reads a daily newspaper or receives a digital news feed would already have known how infectious this disease was. The report by Rosemary Lester states:

‘The use of appropriate PPE is recommended in all healthcare settings, including primary care and health services. … Where the use of appropriate PPE is recommended the equipment must be suitable and maintained. Appropriate training must be provided to the individual using PPE at a time prior to the pandemic to ensure they become competent and proficient in its use’ (p.48).

The managers of Operation Soteria did not exercise their imagination enough to see that the situation of hotel quarantine was a ‘health care setting’. They followed the normal, easy solution of contracting out peripheral health work to private companies, without first ensuring that the workers were properly trained in the use of protective equipment and suitably supplied.

The Health Department leader of the Covid 19 response decided to spread responsibility for the operation among government bureaucrats including police and emergency services. Lester’s report states, ‘The Chief Health Officer or delegate would assume the role of State Controller and liaise closely with the Emergency Management Commission’. The Chief Health Officer of Victoria was reportedly excluded from taking control.

The private companies sub-contracted the work to labour supply companies employing casual workers. Many of these workers in the so-called ‘gig economy’ had several different jobs on the go. Unprotected from the virus, they contracted disease from returned travellers (or allegedly from a night manager of one of the hotels) and, before they began showing symptoms, spread the virus to their families and to colleagues in other work settings, who in turn became infected and spread the virus further through the community, resulting in an explosion of over 18,000 cases of the virus.

The Head of DHSS at the time had no qualifications in either epidemiology or public health; in fact no qualifications in any branch of health. This person was simply a career bureaucrat with a Masters in public administration. The division of the Department of Health and Human Services responsible for epidemic planning (the division of ‘Regulation, Health Protection and Emergency Management’) was headed by another career bureaucrat. This person was previously Deputy Secretary, Budget and Finance, a ‘Director of the Allen Consulting Group and a partner in Deloittes’.

The Division’s functions are described as bringing together ‘professional and epidemiological expertise to protect the Victorian public from avoidable harm. The daily work of the division brings us in contact with such risks as drugs, poisons, infections, contagions, emergency

incidents and the risks of super bugs and pandemics’. In practice, before the outbreak, health professionals were sidelined and given no control over the planning of the response to Covid 19.

The Coate report found that blame for the outbreak could not be assigned to any individual. Nevertheless the Minister of Health was subsequently dismissed from her position, and later resigned from Parliament. The Head of DHSS resigned to become a partner in the ‘strategy focused’ business consultancy firm EY Port Jackson Partners based in Sydney. The divisional manager was stripped of responsibility for Covid planning. Yet the systemic failure of New Public Management was not noted and the concept continues to operate across all departments of the Government of Victoria.

When cautious steps to contain the outbreak failed, the Government of Victoria took decisive steps to contain the virus by preventing people from congregating and thus transmitting the disease. This strategy, coupled with effective testing and tracing was highly successful. But problems with quarantine hotels have since emerged repeatedly in Australia, resulting in temporary lockdowns. Step by step the State Governments have learned from experience what works and what does not. They are now demanding the establishment of specialist out of town quarantine stations to replace inner city hotels.

This quick learning by local political leaders, trusting epidemiological advice, is what has spared Australia from the worst outcomes of Covid 19. But it is time to reassess the effect of New Public Management, which brought the State of Victoria so close to disaster and cost so many lives. The belief that professionals simply promote their own material interests is wrong. Professionals have interests, of course, specific to their disciplines, but those interests can and often do coincide with the public interest. Public health professionals, for instance, have an interest in and a commitment to public health.

Politicians in a democracy are by definition non-experts. Their job is to represent their constituents. That job cannot include understanding all that is required in any particular field to achieve the public interest. The issues involved are invariably complex and require specific training and knowledge. The politician’s job is to listen to professional expert advice and then decide how to act. Fortunately that is what political leaders in Australia have now learned from Covid 19. The NPM assumption that political leaders can do without professionals in leading roles in the public service has been shown to be wrong.

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Why cities planning to spend billions on light rail should look again at what buses can do

Article by Michael McGreevy, Research Associate, Flinders University

Many cities in Australia and around the world have recently made or proposed investments in new light rail systems. They often do so in the belief this will not only increase public transport use, but also lead urban renewal and improve a city’s global image. However, compared to light rail, my research shows a system of buses running along dedicated corridors, known as bus rapid transit, has many advantages for Adelaide (the focus of my research) and cities like it. 

The advantages include: 

  • a bus rapid transit system is cheaper to construct and run 
  • it takes less time to introduce with less disruption 
  • being able to leave designated lanes offers greater flexibility to pick up passengers where and when needed. 

In contrast, retrofitting light rail onto arterial roads has proven expensive, slow and highly disruptive. For example, 12.5km of arterial-based light rail in Sydney cost over A$150 million per kilometre and took more than five years to complete. Given these inherent problems, Australian cities such as Adelaide with new light rail systems on the drawing board should first take another look at bus rapid transit. 

Australian cities face hurdles to public transport use 

Most Australian state and territory governments have similar transport-related goals. These include to become more environmentally sustainable and reduce traffic congestion, which saps productivity. They typically aim to achieve these goals by increasing public transport use at the expense of cars. 

Globally, affluent cities with high levels of public transport use have comprehensive public transport networks. These systems allow people to travel from one place to another anywhere in the city quickly, cheaply and conveniently with minimal interchanges. 

In contrast, Australian cities are car-oriented. Their radial “hub and spoke” public transport systems primarily allow people to get to central business districts and occasionally major regional centres quickly, cheaply and conveniently. They struggle to do so for suburb-to-suburb trips. 

In Australian cities, 75-90% of jobs and commerce are located in their suburbs. This means the structure of public transport is a major challenge for increasing patronage at the expense of cars. But what if existing arterial roads can be converted for use by rapid bus transit? 

Adelaide: a case study 

My research looked at the alternative of bus rapid transit along a corridor in metropolitan Adelaide where a new light rail track is proposed. From the CBD, this corridor runs about 7km east to the hills and 9km west to the sea. As an indication of the likely cost, a 1km extension along North Terrace of an existing line cost more than $A120 million in 2018. 

The area within 3km of the corridor contains around 40% of metropolitan Adelaide’s jobs, major recreation and shopping facilities, most of its universities, and the airport. Buses running in often highly congested and slow traffic provide the only public transport in the area. As a result, public transport use is very low compared to similar areas in other Australian cities. 

Bus rapid transit services run along designated lanes down the centre of arterial roads, as would an arterial-based light rail. 

Like Adelaide’s existing tram lines, a bus rapid transit service would run along the middle of existing arterial roads. Morgan Sette/AAP 

Stops are spaced at similar intervals to light rail and resemble stations rather than a typical bus stop. Such systems are in place around the globe, one of the most famous being in Curitiba, Brazil

The advantages of buses add up 

The great advantage a bus-based system has over light rail is cost. They can run along existing roads and don’t need expensive tracks and overhead wires. 

As a result, bus rapid transit can be built for less than 10% of the cost of light rail. The buses are also cheaper to run per passenger journey and have similar journey speeds to light rail. Bus rapid transit can be established in months rather than years with minimal disruption to surrounding businesses and residents. 

Buses do have some disadvantages compared to light rail. For a start, when diesel buses are used, they cause significant noise and air pollution. Using electric buses can overcome these problems.

In addition, individual vehicles normally carry fewer passengers than light rail. However, my research shows low passenger capacity per vehicle is an advantage in low-density suburban areas, such as those along the proposed corridor in Adelaide. That’s because it means the buses have to run more often, making the service more regular, convenient and reliable. 

Another advantage over light rail is that in low-density areas, vehicles can leave designated lanes and venture for 2-4km into suburbs to pick up and drop off passengers. This vastly expands the number of households in the system’s catchment and means passengers can get to their destinations with no interchange or just one. 

Finally, the inner and middle suburbs of Adelaide, where most residents live and work, have many wide straight roads suitable for bus rapid transit services. It would be possible to develop around 100km of BRT lanes connecting existing light rail, heavy rail and busway infrastructure. I estimate a comprehensive network could be built for well under a billion dollars in a few years. 

A similarly sized light rail network would cost tens of billions of dollars and take decades to complete, if it was to happen at all. 

Therefore, if cities want people to switch from cars to public transport, bus rapid transit is the superior option in metropolitan Adelaide and potentially other cities with arterial road networks and low suburban densities.


Article republished from The Conversation

 

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Melburnians urged to ditch cars for short trips

Article by Jackie Fristacky

As more people turn to driving post COVID, peak transport advocacy group, Transport for Everyone (T4e) is asking that the Victorian Government better educate Melbournians on the adverse impacts of driving fuel-based vehicles on city emissions, especially for short trips.

T4e highlights the New Zealand Energy & Conservation Authority (EECA) finding released last Friday, that 3 out of 5 people did not know that reducing the use of petrol and diesel cars is one of the most effective means of reducing emissions and climate change. This is despite reducing fuel usage from driving being nearly 4 times more effective in reducing emissions than recycling from the waste stream. Thus the EECA is urging Kiwis to swap the car especially for short trips. See: https://www.stuff.co.nz/environment/climate-news/124586956/kiwis-urged-to-swap-the-car-for-a-cycle-walk-or-scoot-on-short-trips

T4e urges Melburnians to similarly think about their contribution to city emissions and poorer air quality through short trips and consider simple alternatives. The organisation’s President, Jackie Fristacky joins the EECA in emphasising that “It is short car trips of 1-2 kms that produce the highest emissions compared to longer trips, because cold engines use more fuel and multiple short trips bring more toxic emissions.”

“With over 20% of car trips being under 2kms, 10% under 1 km, and 50% under 5 kms, these trips can readily be converted to walking or cycling, with huge multiple benefits in reducing emissions, congestion, travel cost burdens on households and improving health,” said President Fristacky.

Data from the Department of Industry, Science, Energy and Resources has shown that while emissions from energy sources have fallen, emissions from transport were 33% higher in 2018-19 than in 2001-2002. Further, our National Transport Commission has identified that passenger cars in Australia produce 41% more emissions per km than in Europe and 16% more than in the US.

T4e has written to the Minister for Roads and Public Transport seeking that the Government combat rising emissions from transport by budget allocations in the May 2021 budget to upscale investment in walking, cycling, and electric vehicle recharging, vastly improving bus frequency and connectivity, and urging Victorians to use alternatives to driving, especially for short trips.

For more information, contact Cr Jackie Fristacky AM, President, Transport for Everyone (T4e) on Mobile 0412 597 794 or transport4everyone1@gmail.com

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Taxing electric vehicles

A knee jerk reaction to a broader problem and sends the wrong message.

The State government intends to implement a 2.5 cent/km charge on electric and other zero emission vehicles, including hydrogen vehicles, and a 2.0 cent/km charge to plug-in hybrid-electric vehicles. It argues that owners will continue to pay a fraction of the motor vehicle-related taxes and charges that other vehicle owners pay to encourage uptake, while still making a fair contribution to the cost of building and maintaining the road network Victorians rely on everyday. It also argues that revenue raised from this charge will enable the government to continue to invest in the road and transport network, including in new electric vehicle charging infrastructure and reforms to enable electric vehicle ready new buildings.

TfM has a number of concerns with this policy.

First, whilst electric vehicles will not be the answer to our transport problems (embedded energy/environmental costs associated with mining, processing of raw materials, manufacturing etc are significant, they still need to be charged and disposal at the end of the life cycle is problematic) they are a considerable advance on conventional motor vehicles as far as emissions are concerned and should be promoted. These vehicles are already expensive and a state government tax on them at this time sends the wrong message.

Second, vehicle registration and other taxes should be the principal funding source for road maintenance – not capital works and is an area that is already grossly underfunded. The condition of our roads has been a matter of grave concern for many years and will soon become critical.

As noted in the Auditor General’s report (Maintaining State-Controlled Roadways. Andrew Greaves, Auditor-General, 22 June 2017) :

“We rely on roads for access to work, schools, shops, recreational activities, health care and other services. Roads also play a critical role in the movement of freight and goods across Victoria. VicRoads manages about 24 000 kilometres of arterial roads.

Road networks in poor condition cost the community more, through increased fuel usage, vehicle maintenance costs and travel times. When road surfaces—referred to as road pavements—are in poor condition, they are also more expensive to maintain and repair.

The report concluded

“The increasing proportion of the state road network in very poor condition presents a growing risk to public safety and increases road user costs.

Not enough funding is allocated to road maintenance to sustain the road network, but VicRoads also cannot demonstrate clearly that it is making the best use of its existing maintenance funds.

Its approach to road pavement maintenance is reactive, with maintenance generally being carried out only when it becomes critical. Targeted early intervention to prevent roads from needing more costly and extensive maintenance has been limited. This approach has not kept up with the rate of deterioration of road pavements across the network”.

Little has changed since this report was written. Concerns tabled above are short term governance issues which must be addressed as a matter of course but raise more fundamental concerns for the longer term. Environmental change will force fundamental change in the way all societies live, and the imperative to consume less, and reduce waste, pollution and environmental degradation. From the transport perspective this means traveling and transporting less, less often and doing so more efficiently. This must be reflected in the way our roads are designed, used and managed.

The most appropriate policy response is therefore to manage them in a way that reflects these imperatives with “carrots and sticks”. Heavy vehicles, which do most of the damage to our roads should be taxed to reflect this and incentives provided to transport goods and services in a more efficient manner – such as by rail which is significantly underutilised, and by a range of other measures that reduce the freight and passenger task in the first place. Government should also use road infrastructure in a way that favours more efficient modes of travel such as road-based public and active transport (walking and cycling).

There also needs to be an appreciation that supplies of materials required for road maintenance are limited and this is becoming increasingly critical, particularly bitumen, concrete sand and aggregate. Government must respond by reducing the stock of infrastructure (contrary to public perceptions, Victoria has an abundance of road infrastructure, much of it overdesigned in terms of scale) and use what we have more efficiently instead of building more. As noted in the Auditor General report the cost of poorly maintained infrastructure is already high and a false economy which will end up costing the state government and the Victorian community dearly if it is not addressed soon.

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Victoria’s Draft 30-year Infrastructure strategy

Submission by Transport for Melbourne 21 February 2021

General comments  

Transport for Melbourne (TfM) welcomes the invitation by IV for community feedback and submissions for its draft 30-year Plan. We appreciate the opportunity to review it and discuss fundamental assumptions that underpin it as well as the principle objectives and guiding principles that have been used to develop the plan. There are a number of key principles we support and think it appropriate these be restated in our submission.  

TfM acknowledges the need for an infrastructure plan to be developed based on a framework that best meets community aspirations and values for this State, supported by guiding principles and processes which enable projects to be evaluated and ranked to ensure the program meets the needs of Victorians and provides the best possible return on investment for the community based on a triple bottom line evaluation process.   

This plan must acknowledge (and we believe IV does) that physical infrastructure cannot solve all problems. Further, that the prime function of physical infrastructure is to support social, community and business services and activity and that it is critical this be provided, managed and maintained in the most cost effective and efficient manner to meet these needs. It is a waste of money if it fails to do so recognising benefits are maximised if the service values/outputs are maximised and the cost of providing, managing and maintaining the infrastructure are minimised.  

It follows that physical infrastructure has no intrinsic value on its own and pursued in isolation simply becomes an exercise in temple building which can be used/abused for political purposes with little accountability. We believe that in the absence of good governance and proper process this can have a very damaging impact with profound implications at all levels – socials, economic, political.  

An extension of the above is our concern for the need for good governance and adherence to proper process. This has been a growing concern and was the subject of Transport for Melbourne’s annual forum in 2017. This issue will become increasingly critical in the future and it is pleasing that this is reflected in IV’s plan.  

We agree it is important that a plan be developed with goals/objectives and guiding principles to achieve them. IV has listed ten of these. These must be linked with scenarios for the future – the future we must plan for. Without this planning is merely wishful thinking and a waste of time. IV rightly considers the need for short, medium and long term planning horizons, recognising that the future is becoming very uncertain and difficult to plan for, and there is a compelling need to provide flexibility and adaptability/agility as conditions change or underlying assumptions become invalid.  

Covid has demonstrated how quickly and profoundly situations can change. It has exposed our vulnerability to sudden shocks and the need for planning to reflect this. This is of particular relevance for the design and provision of physical infrastructure, much of which tends to be set in concrete with a high risk of becoming a stranded asset as conditions change.  

IV has rightly drawn attention to climate and environmental change and the need to respond.  

Climate Emergency  

The dimensions, scale, complexity and urgency of this issue have not been reflected in IV’s 30-year plan and targets and assumptions used in it are outdated. This has profound implications for many of the of key assumptions in the plan and the integrity of the plan itself.  

Environmental change and its implications for the future was the subject of the Sustainable Cities Sustainable Transport forum held in 2009, and updated on 4th December 2020. The program for both forums and forum summary are attached. [1] Prof Will Steffen who presented at both forums has, as a member of The Climate Targets Panel in January 2021 titled Australia’s Paris Agreement Pathways: Updating Climate Change Authority’s 2014 Emission Reduction Targets presented the following key findings     

“As the Secretary General of the United Nations has repeatedly warned, we are in a climate emergency. The window for action is closing, with recent research suggesting climate tipping points may be breached very soon. Australia’s Bureau of Meteorology recently gave evidence to the Australian Parliament that the country is on track for 4.4°C of warming this century. This would be catastrophic for our society, health, economy and environment”. 

The Climate Targets Panel has concluded:  

To be consistent with the Paris Agreement goal of limiting global warming to 1.5°C, Australia’s 2030 emissions reduction target must be 74% below 2005 levels, with net-zero emissions reached by 2035.  

As noted above, Transport for Melbourne’s annual forum round table on the 4th December 2020, reviewed the dimensions and scale of these issues with even more compelling findings. Whilst reduction of Greenhouse emissions are critical, actions to reduce them, will not on their own be sufficient to address our climate emergency. The need to address the degradation of the biosphere is becoming increasingly critical and will soon become the factor that ultimately drives climate change/global warming and determines our fate. Despite this, governments have not responded with targets on this issue. It is also clear that emission reduction targets will continue to be reviewed and revised as modelling becomes more sophisticated and the climate situation evolves. It is feasible that targets outlined in the report above may already be outdated. Prof David Karoly indicated at our forum that we need an even greater reduction of 125% by 2030 and that there are some potential shocks in the science that have still to be published.  It was also proposed that 4.4 degrees may well be lower limit and could be as high as 6 degrees. But this is a global figure and for Australia the figure will be significantly higher.    

Some of the critical actions required to respond to our climate emergency include the need to     

  • Reduce our consumption and the demands we make on the planet’s natural resources    
  • A giant Landcare/Earthcare project to restore much of the environment we have trashed – not just in Australia but throughout the world 
  • Huge waste reduction, reuse and effective recycling programs to reduce the poisoning impact on our planet and the demand we make on it harvesting the resources we need  
  • These activities will create many new jobs but we need to value these jobs properly and financially  
  • Change the way we produce and harvest food – it is this activity which is the cause of many of our environmental problems today  
  • The need for a fundamental shift in mindset about the limits to growth (both population and economic) recognising that we have already passed them in a biophysical sense and that sooner or later we will be forced to depopulate remembering that if we don’t the planet will do it for us. This is also a reminder that contrary to current thinking and expectations, technology will not solve our problems. The evidence overwhelmingly points to the risk that on its own technology will most likely make matters worse and must be used as a support for behavioural change.       

Implications of global biophysical change are profound and will impact all societies at every level: the way people live and work, particularly in our cities, what jobs have value, the population that can be supported, how communities can be fed, serviced, maintained and managed, land use and how the economy is structured. 

It has been clear for many decades there are no magic single fix solutions to this challenge. It is a problem that has been generated by the social, economic and political “system” that underpins modern human societies. This “system” has operated for thousands of years but the impact has accelerated significantly since the Industrial revolution and again since WW2 largely as a result of huge advances in science and technology that have enable humanity to plunder the natural resources and degrade/destroy the biosphere to such an extent that humanity is now living beyond the capacity of planet earth to support us and in a way that is contributing to climate change and global warming. Further, that business as usual will put us on a hothouse trajectory that will be irreversible and ultimately lead to our extinction – most likely well before the end of this century. 

It is this system with its beliefs, expectations, values and behaviours that must change.

Prof Johan Rockstrom (Potsdam, Germany ) described our situation in late 2019 as so serious it will require an effort equivalent to the Apollo program to achieve success. Apollo was a large-scale concerted effort involving science, politics, the public sector and industry employing resilience and creativity. There was a common goal. With climate, he argues there is little time left. We have less than ten years to transition the whole world to a new logic. Success or failure lies in our hands.  

Implications for IV’s 30-year Plan 

Broader issues   

The implications for IV’s 30-year plan are profound. Every single issue addressed in the plan has been on the basis of incremental change and business as usual parameters and projections to varying degrees. All of these will become outdated and invalidated very quickly as the impact of rapid environmental change manifests itself and will do so in a way that challenges traditional values and behaviours, expectations and aspirations within our existing social, economic, political “system”. It is a system that will be have to change, whether we like it or not and in the process put under enormous stress. We believe this must be reflected in IV’s plan.  

Limits to Growth 

Many of the recommendations developed in IV’s 30-plan have been based on the expectation of continuing population and economic growth. It is critical that limits to growth are reflected in this plan with an understanding that these have already been exceeded and whilst there is some momentum for further population growth this will be limited and quickly reversed before long.  

Limits to Growth was the subject of the Club of Rome’s report in the early 1970’s which has been updated regularly since, including 2008 by Dr Graham Turner (CSIRO) with findings presented at the 2009 forum. These projections excluded the impact of climate change. With its inclusion and the compounding impact it provides, societies are rapidly approaching tipping points which will have profound implications for the provision of the necessities of life – particularly food and fresh water at a time when traditional practices are coming under increasing scrutiny and pressure to change. Under this scenario all objectives in IV’s plan need to be challenged and replaced by a one’s that provide a response to the impending climate emergency and “system change” in which the word sustainable is replaced by “survival” and notions of growth become irrelevant.

System Change, Goals, Priorities and Time Frames

The climate emergency has been predicted for many decades and many voices have been warning of the need to act. It is a scenario that few political leaders have been prepared to acknowledge let alone embrace and scientific evidence indicates that the worse case scenario might be an underestimate of the future we must plan for. It is recommended therefore that the maximum time frame for IV can be no more than 10 years ie the time required to achieve system change and targets outlined above. Anything beyond must be considered highly problematic at best, or irrelevant and most likely an acknowledgement of failure.  Recommendations should be designed to contribute to the following goals ie outlined above with measurable targets 

  1. Reduction of greenhouse emissions based on latest targets by the Climate Targets Panel but anticipate these may be tightened further ie to 125% by 2030 or even more    
  2. Reduce consumption of everything, particularly of natural resources 
  3. Stop degradation of the biosphere – every aspect of it and commence restoration as a top priority immediately 
  4. Mechanisms to commence system change at all levels.

Items 2 and 3 have already been noted earlier. Governance and proper process will become critical factors in progressing item 4.

Priority should be given to

  • proposals that provide a direct response to the climate emergency consistent with the necessary “system” transformation  
  • programs and projects that provide outcomes/outputs that can be measured against environmental targets on a system wide basis rather than inputs or wishful thinking based on business as usual  
  • measures that deliver benefits quickly – the shorter the better because time is critical. We cannot wait for large scale projects to be completed. It is unlikely any of the mega- infrastructure projects in the State Government’s big build would comply anyway. At the very least they should be independently reviewed and a system developed for prioritising them that is consistent with environment goals and targets   
  • ignore concerns about the need to support industries and services that will have no future – the challenge for the airline industry for example to meet zero green house emissions by 2030 is immense. Almost certainly it will become a sunset industry with stranded assets – public and private 
  • support industries that have a future and contribute to goals and targets outlined above and the system transformation necessary to make it happen  
  • projects that deliver behavioural change. This will include those that use technology as an aid to achieve it rather than a means on its own, but many of the levers required to achieve behavioural change may not be technology based.

Whilst it is tempting to recommend individual projects, greatest impacts will occur from initiatives that promote behavioural change within the system as a whole. This can be achieved by applying levers where small interventions in one area create larger changes system wide, with impacts that can be measured and compared against system goals and targets. It must be recognised that there are no single fix solutions. Many of the initiatives will require the creation of new jobs and new industries and opportunities for government to invest. This can become a mechanism for addressing many of social/poverty issues.

Transport Implications

Transport is a derived demand based on the social, economic, technological, political and environmental system that prevails at the time and will be subject to profound change. Current modelling, largely based on business as usual must be replaced with one that reflects the need to respond to the climate emergency.

Transport goals must be to travel less, less often and more efficiently. Government must provide the incentives to do so this with appropriate design and management of its stock of infrastructure. Government must make more efficient use of existing infrastructure and resist the temptation to build more. There will be increasing pressure to do this as communities come under increasing social and economic stress as environmental pressure mounts.  Achieving zero emissions must be based on emissions from every part of the lifecycle including imbedded energy, maintenance, renewal etc and calculated on a whole of life basis. This has huge implications for all modes of transport including public transport. The only mode that meets this target for personal travel at this time is active transport – walking and cycling.

This in turn has implications for transport infrastructure and the need to reduce its cost and promote most efficient modes of travel. This is of particular significance for freeways and tollways which promote more travel rather than less, encourage people to travel longer distances rather than shorter and more often using least efficient modes (cars and trucks). The inevitable increase in social and economic stress caused by environmental change will also challenge government’s ability to finance high cost infrastructure, particularly mega infrastructure projects in the State government’s Big Build program.

Concluding Comments

The integrity of any plan depends on the assumptions and guiding principles that underpin it. Any flaws will cast doubt on the integrity of the entire plan. The fatal flaw in IV’s latest 30-year draft plan is its failure to accept that climate and environmental change is manifesting itself not just as a challenge for the future but in a way that threatens all life on the planet and as a consequence must be classified as a climate emergency and addressed as the top priority.

This requires a fundamental change in mindset and reinforces the need to abandon a number of assumptions that have contributed to the current situation. This includes the need for continuing growth (population and economic), reliance on technology to solve our environmental problems and a belief that this can be done in a way that avoids radical system change – a change that reflects our values, aspirations/expectations and choices we make in the way we live. In other words it overturns the popular view by politicians, policy makers and the business community that our climate emergency can be resolved largely by bolting a greenhouse reduction program driven by technology onto “business as usual”.

In this respect the response to the Covid “emergency” is instructive. During the last year it has resulted in a significant reduction in greenhouse emissions, particularly in transport, but this has not been the result of technology or market forces. It has been driven by behavioural change forced by the pandemic itself and government intervention which has been supported in turn by existing technology – not new. The climate emergency will force far greater and more profound change and like covid demand major behavioural change and this will have to be driven by government intervention – not market forces, with technology playing a supporting role. Covid has also demonstrated that in the event of an emergency the need to act is now – one cannot wait for new technology and rely on it to solve the problem.  The same rationale applies to infrastructure and mega-infrastructure projects with long lead times.

Politicians, policy makers and planners have failed to grasp these imperatives but mindsets are changing as evidence of the rapidly changing world and its impact on humanity becomes increasingly apparent. IV has an opportunity to reflect this in its plan and cite the overwhelming scientific evidence to support it. TfM believes the criteria which underpin program recommendations must as a consequence be revisited and changed in light of the above.  

It is also recommended that infrastructure needs be assessed on the basis of comprehensive plans designed specifically to meet environment goals outlined above instead of on the basis an adhoc list of projects.

Comment On Specific Recommendations

There are some proposals outlined in the 30-year plan that have merit in the short term. Some are no brainers that have been recommended for many years and should be actioned immediately. We also have concerns about others. These are reviewed briefly in general terms below.

  1. Preparation of environmental scenarios based on latest scientific evidence is critical.  This must include social, political and economic impacts to confirm the future we must plan for. This is something TfM has been arguing for many years 
  2. Improved governance and accountability is essential and must be reflected in every aspect of government activity. The need to prepare (and publish) a transport plan for Victoria is only one example, but such a plan must be consistent with environmental goals and targets outlined in this submission and open to public scrutiny  
  3. Improved energy efficiency is important for all activities, not just for households. Phasing out of coal power generation and gas and replaced with renewable energy is critical but this needs to be supported by a proper plan that encourages people and business to use less power in the first place  
  4. We support a number of IV’s public transport recommendations, such as network improvements for buses and trams and other service improvements, including the introduction of electric buses but all of these must be developed as part of a comprehensive public transport service plan that includes all PT modes, with clear objectives, and targets that contribute to global targets for the transport system as a whole 
  5. Reallocation of road space to priority modes is critical and must also be an integral part of the PT service plan but must also be seen as part of a holistic transport strategy for the system as a whole  
  6. Active transport is the only form of transport that is remotely sustainable and an environment must be created that makes this a mode of first choice for many more trips. We don’t need more data on this – we know what to do and must get on with the job of making it happen  
  7. Concerns regarding congestion and travel behaviour need to be reviewed – but need to be thought of in terms of system inefficiency and a systems based strategy that includes service and regulatory levers rather than the band-aid approach proposed on this plan. There are many ways to change travel behaviour – pricing is only one and a very inefficient one at that. Reliance on this alone is simplistic and will deliver poor outcomes   
  8. TfM does not support the recommendation to charge different PT modes separately. PT works as a system and pricing must reflect this.    
  9. Similar comment applies to numerous recommendations on road pricing in this plan. There are other ways of looking at this which have been discussed in a paper prepared by TfM    
  10. The need for integrated transport and land use planning has been acknowledged for decades – but requires one that integrates land use with all modes of travel, not just the motor car   
  11. Waste reduction is critical but it is important this be carried out comprehensively. There will be no simple single fix solutions  
  12. Increased tree canopy for our cities is important but is a first step towards a major habitat restoration program noted earlier in our submission 
  13. The need for more public housing has been acknowledged for a long time, but there are many ways of doing this. Building more public housing is only one way of achieving this 
  14. TfM has serious concerns about the State government’s Big Build projects. They are too costly, take too long, most will have a perverse environmental impact and even the best of them will make a minimal contribution to environmental goals and targets. All run the risk of becoming stranded assets very quickly and leave Victoria with a huge debt burden 
  15. The climate emergency will require mega programs to progress “system” change. These may require some physical infrastructure but it is not yet clear what this might be.

R D Taylor

Roger Taylor
Chair Transport for Melbourne

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